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PREVENTING ERRONEOUS EXPEDITED REMOVALS: 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE REVIEW AND REQUESTS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF NEGATIVE CREDIBLE FEAR 
DETERMINATIONS 
Katherine Shattuck* 
Abstract: The Central American refugee crisis has renewed criticism of expedited 
removal, which allows immigration officials to remove without a hearing certain noncitizens 
who seek to enter or have entered the United States. Asylum seekers who arrive at the border 
or ports of entry without entry documents undergo a screening process to determine whether 
they have a “credible fear of persecution.” An individual who receives a positive credible 
fear determination is entitled to a full hearing before an immigration judge. In contrast, an 
individual who receives a negative credible fear determination is typically subjected to 
expedited removal. Scholars and human rights advocates have long argued that the credible 
fear determination process fails to adequately identify bona fide asylum seekers, and that the 
power vested in individual immigration officers is susceptible to abuse. 
This Comment examines two little-discussed administrative mechanisms that can prevent 
the erroneous expedited removal of asylum seekers: review of a negative credible fear 
determination by an immigration judge (IJ); and requests for reconsideration (RFRs), 
whereby a person who receives a negative credible fear determination may petition the 
Asylum Office for a positive fear finding or a re-interview. The Comment describes the 
mechanics of, and current practices surrounding, IJ review and RFRs. Data from the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) suggest that IJ review and RFRs dramatically improve the accuracy of 
credible fear determinations, particularly in cases involving detained families. But the 
immigration agencies have failed to consistently implement either process, undermining their 
potential to prevent the removal of people who may face persecution in their home countries. 
This Comment concludes by proposing reforms to fortify IJ review and RFRs. EOIR 
should allow counsel to advocate on behalf of clients during IJ review and should permit 
asylum seekers to introduce before the IJ information not disclosed during the credible fear 
interview. Moreover, USCIS should direct the Asylum Office to grant an asylum seeker’s 
RFR upon a showing that an official erred during the credible fear interview or that a second 
interview will yield new information about the asylum seeker’s claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
In late 2015, Martiza1 fled El Salvador to seek asylum in the United 
States.2 She wanted to escape her abusive husband, who began beating 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. Special thanks to 
Professor Angélica Cházaro and Chris Strawn for their invaluable guidance and comments on 
earlier drafts and to the exceptional team at Washington Law Review. Any errors are my own.  
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her while she was pregnant with their second child and often swore he 
would kill her.3 She also feared members of the MS-13 gang.4 When 
Martiza reached the United States-Mexico border, she was detained and 
taken to the Karnes County Residential Center, an immigration detention 
facility in Texas that holds nearly 600 women and children.5 There an 
asylum officer interviewed Martiza to determine if she was eligible to 
apply for asylum.6 
The interview produced only part of Martiza’s story. A year and a 
half before Martiza fled El Salvador, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
held in a landmark decision that survivors of gender-based violence may 
qualify for asylum.7 But the asylum officer never asked Martiza if she 
suffered domestic violence in El Salvador; and Martiza, who assumed 
that MS-13’s extortion and death threats were more important to her 
asylum claim, said nothing about her husband’s abuse.8 At the end of the 
interview, the asylum officer concluded that Martiza lacked a credible 
fear of persecution, and was ineligible to apply for asylum.9 Martiza 
appealed that finding to an immigration judge (IJ).10 The IJ affirmed her 
negative credible fear determination.11 Martiza was then ordered to be 
                                                     
1. “Martiza” is a pseudonym. See Letter from Am. Immigration Council et al. to Directors of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Servs. and Immigration and Customs Enf’t Concerning Due Process 
Violations at Det. Facilities 4 (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/ 
2015/letter-uscis-ice-due-process [https://perma.cc/72U5-C8SF] [hereinafter Letter on Due Process 
Violations]. 
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. Id.at 4–5. 
5. Id. at 4; DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CTRS., REPORT OF THE DHS 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS 3 (2016), https://www.ice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6N3-LPLP] 
[hereinafter DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT]. The “residential center” in Karnes is managed by the 
GEO Group, a private prison corporation. See Karnes County Residential Center, GEO GRP., INC., 
https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/58 [https://perma.cc/T78R-YQ42] . 
6. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) 
(2012) (explaining that an individual who is found to have “a credible fear of persecution” may 
proceed to seek asylum).  
7. In re A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” can constitute a cognizable particular social 
group for purposes of an asylum or withholding of removal claim).  
8. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5.  
9. Id. at 5. Courts continue to grapple with whether, and under what circumstances, extortion 
provides a basis for a viable asylum claim. See, e.g., Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 59 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(recognizing that “extortion itself can constitute persecution”). 
10. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5.  
11. Id.  
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removed to El Salvador without a hearing, according to a law that 
authorizes the fast-track removal of noncitizens without valid entry 
documents.12 
Racing against the clock, a team of volunteer lawyers submitted a 
request for reconsideration (RFR) to the Houston Asylum Office on 
Martiza’s behalf.13 In the RFR, they noted that the asylum officer had 
failed to elicit during the credible fear interview information about the 
domestic violence Martiza suffered in El Salvador.14 Martiza’s attorneys 
requested that the Asylum Office grant Martiza a second interview so 
that she could fully explain her fear of returning home.15 The next day, 
the Asylum Office denied the RFR.16 Martiza was put on a plane and 
flown back to El Salvador to face the man she thought would kill her.17 
Martiza is one of a growing number of noncitizens who have been 
denied humanitarian protection in the United States and summarily 
returned to violent homelands they said they feared.18 Historically, 
noncitizens who entered the United States and requested asylum were 
allowed to present their claims for protection before an immigration 
court.19 But the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) upended that process.20 IIRIRA 
                                                     
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012).  
13. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5. The eight regional asylum offices in 
the United States form part of the Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate, a 
division of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Refugee, Asylum, and International 
Operations Directorate, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/directorates-and-program-offices/refugee-asylum-and-international-operations-directorate 
[https://perma.cc/Z7CC-N26V].  
14. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5 
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
17. Id. 
18. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, No Refuge, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2017, at 32, 34 (describing the 
Global Migration Project’s database of cases in which noncitizens removed from the United States 
suffered death, torture, kidnapping, sexual assault, and other harms in their home countries); Sibylla 
Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American Migrants to Their 
Deaths, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-
immigration-deportations-central-america [https://perma.cc/2AJW-598N] (referencing study that 
identified eighty-three noncitizens who were deported to their deaths in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras); Trauma in Family Immigration Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/15/us-trauma-family-immigration-detention-0 
[https://perma.cc/93ZD-5GJL] (recounting stories of two female asylum seekers who were removed 
from the United States and severely abused in their home countries). 
19. See infra section I.B.  
20. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546.  
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introduced forms of summary deportation, including expedited removal 
and reinstatement of removal, that allow immigration officers to return 
certain noncitizens to their home countries without a hearing before an 
IJ.21 These days, most people who are removed from the United States 
never appear in a courtroom.22 
Asylum seekers are supposed to be spared immediate summary 
removal.23 Noncitizens who arrive at a United States border or port of 
entry and say they fear returning home are referred to asylum officers for 
interviews to determine whether their fear of persecution is sufficiently 
“credible” to support an asylum claim.24 If an officer determines that a 
noncitizen has “a significant possibility” of “establish[ing] eligibility for 
asylum,” the noncitizen is placed into regular removal proceedings and 
allowed to present a claim for relief before an IJ.25 In contrast, a 
noncitizen who receives a negative credible fear determination is subject 
to removal “without further hearing or review.”26 
The past decade has seen sharp increases in recently arrived 
noncitizens who express fear of persecution. In fiscal year 2009, United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) made 5,369 
                                                     
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012) (outlining expedited removal); id. § 1231(a)(5) 
(outlining reinstatement of removal).  
22. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
183 (2017) (“[T]he vast majority of cases in which the government issues removal orders against 
noncitizens never reach the immigration courts.”). Of the 340,056 noncitizens deported in fiscal 
year 2016, 141,518 people were subjected to expedited removal and 143,003 people were subjected 
to reinstatement of removal. BRYAN BAKER, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2016, at 8 (2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HU4N-VAYY]. 
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).  
24. Id.  
25. Id. (a noncitizen determined to have “a credible fear of persecution” must “be detained for 
further consideration of the application for asylum”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (outlining initiation of 
removal proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2017) (a noncitizen determined to have “a credible fear 
of persecution or torture” will receive “full consideration of the asylum and withholding of removal 
claim”). Regular removal proceedings, also known as “section 240 removal proceedings” for the 
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1229, take place in 
immigration court and afford noncitizens greater procedural protections.  
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). This process differs for noncitizens who seek humanitarian 
protection in the United States after having been removed. These noncitizens face the threat of 
reinstatement of removal and undergo “reasonable fear” interviews with asylum officers. 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 208.31(b), 1208.31(b). If a person is determined to have a “reasonable fear of persecution or 
torture,” that person may apply for withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against 
Torture before an IJ. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(e), 1208.31(e). Noncitizens previously removed are 
statutorily barred from seeking asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). This Comment focuses on expedited 
removal and credible fear interviews; however, many of its insights are relevant to the reinstatement 
context, as well. 
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credible fear determinations.27 By fiscal year 2016, that figure had 
soared to 92,990 determinations.28 The leap largely reflected rising 
migration from Central America: since 2008, the United Nations has 
recorded a fivefold increase in the number of asylum seekers who have 
fled El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for the United States.29 
USCIS statistics show that the majority of credible fear interviews result 
in positive credible fear determinations.30 But each year asylum officers 
issue thousands of negative credible fear determinations to putative 
asylum seekers.31 In fiscal year 2016 alone, 9,697 individuals received 
negative credible fear determinations.32 Put otherwise, there were 4,334 
more credible fear denials in 2016 than there were determinations in 
2009.33 
As Martiza’s case suggests, the credible fear process is fraught with 
potential for error. Language barriers, official oversight, and trauma or 
disability may prevent an asylum seeker from disclosing in an initial 
interview why that person fled to the United States.34 Legal scholars and 
human rights observers have long argued that the credible fear process 
fails to adequately identify bona fide asylum seekers, and that the power 
vested in individual immigration officials is susceptible to abuse.35 The 
                                                     
27. Asylum Abuse: Is it Overwhelming Our Borders? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren) [hereinafter Asylum Hearing].  
28. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR AND REASONABLE FEAR 
STATISTICS AND NATIONALITY REPORT (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ 
Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_CredibleFearReasonableFearStatisticsNat
ionalityReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2PF-WYE3] [hereinafter CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS 2016]. 
29. António Guterres, Foreword to U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: 
FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND 
MEXICO (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https:// 
perma.cc/GUY3-C8WV] [hereinafter WOMEN ON THE RUN]. 
30. Positive credible fear determinations were granted in 73,081 of 92,990 cases in fiscal year 
2016. CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS 2016, supra note 28. 
31. See id.  
32. Id. 
33. Id.; Asylum Hearing, supra note 27, at 5.  
34. See, e.g., KATHRYN SHEPHERD & ROYCE BERNSTEIN MURRAY, THE PERILS OF EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL: HOW FAST-TRACK DEPORTATIONS JEOPARDIZE ASYLUM SEEKERS 1–3 (2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_perils_of_expedited_r
emoval_how_fast-track_deportations_jeopardize_detained_asylum_seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/H 
DV2-UHXT] (summarizing report on the “serious obstacles” many noncitizens face to accessing the 
asylum process).  
35. See, e.g., Asylum Hearing, supra note 27, at 166 (statement of Leslie E. Vélez, Senior 
Protection Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (stating that the “significant 
possibility” standard for establishing credible fear under United States law is so onerous as to be 
inconsistent with international standards); Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules are Made 
to Be Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
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Obama and Trump administrations’ attempts to use expedited removal to 
deter migration from Central America have renewed such concerns.36 So 
has the Trump administration’s pledge to expand Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) authority to subject noncitizens to 
expedited removal.37 
This Comment discusses two administrative mechanisms embedded 
in the credible fear process that may prevent the erroneous expedited 
removal of bona fide asylum seekers: (1) IJ review of negative credible 
fear determinations,38 and (2) RFRs, whereby a person whose negative 
credible fear determination has been affirmed by an IJ may petition the 
Asylum Office for a positive credible fear determination or a re-
interview.39 Focusing on cases involving detained families,40 this 
Comment argues that IJ review and RFRs are crucial, if imperfect, safety 
valves in the expedited removal regime. In fiscal years 2014 through 
2016, IJs vacated 1,157 negative credible fear determinations in cases 
involving detained families.41 During the same period, RFRs prompted 
the Asylum Office to reverse over 200 negative credible fear 
determinations in cases involving detained families.42 These figures 
underscore both the deficiencies of the credible fear process and the 
bona fide nature of the vast majority of the claims for protection asserted 
by Central American families. Yet the government has failed to issue 
updated guidance on IJ review and RFRs, and agency officials 
inconsistently administer both processes. As a result, IJ review and 
                                                     
167, 193–94 (2006) (describing pervasive “rule-breaking” by government officials during 
screenings of undocumented persons at ports of entry); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International 
Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 
37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 137 (2001) (“The ‘expedited removal’ process violates the rights of 
refugees and abrogates the duties of the United States to refugees in numerous ways.”); SHEPHERD 
& BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 3 (“The credible fear interview process is potentially rife 
with procedural errors.”).  
36. See infra section I.A. 
37. See infra section I.A. 
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2) (2017).  
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A); Memorandum from Michael A. Benson, Exec. Assoc. 
Comm’r for Field Operations, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs. & 
Asylum Office Dirs. regarding Expedited Removal: Additional Policy Guidance (Dec. 30, 1997) 
[hereinafter Expedited Removal Policy Guidance]. 
40. There are currently three operational family detention centers in the United States. The 
Karnes County Residential Center, located in Karnes City, Texas, has the capacity to hold 
approximately 595 women and children. The South Texas Family Residential Center, located in 
Dilley, Texas, has a 2,400-bed capacity. The Berks Family Residential Center holds approximately 
100 people. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.  
41. See infra Part III. 
42. See infra Part III.  
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RFRs do not reliably forestall the expedited removal of noncitizens with 
potentially viable claims for relief. 
Three areas of scholarship inform this Comment. First, IJ review and 
RFRs illustrate what Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman, and Amna Akbar have 
described as the “paralegal” nature of immigration enforcement: the 
everyday practices surrounding RFRs, and, to a lesser extent, IJ review, 
are shaped less by codified rules than by negotiations between frontline 
immigration officials and nongovernmental actors who represent asylum 
seekers.43 Second, the Comment sheds light on the complicated and 
often arbitrary “shadow proceedings” outside immigration courts that 
lead to the majority of removal orders against noncitizens.44 Finally, the 
Comment draws upon, and seeks to contribute to, research on the 
intersection of family detention, asylum law, and pro bono efforts to 
protect the rights of detained families.45 
The first three parts of this Comment describe the mechanics and 
significance of RFRs: what they are, how they function in practice, and 
why they matter. Part I examines the recent increase in migration to the 
United States from Central America, situates IJ review and RFRs in 
                                                     
43. Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman, & Amna Akbar, Missing in Action: Practice, Paralegality, and 
the Nature of Immigration Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUDS. 547, 549–53 (2017); see also 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 121 (2014) (“In theory, immigration law 
starts with Congress, but in practice it is made in the field.”).  
44. Koh, supra note 22, at 193 (arguing that “the standard narrative about immigration 
adjudication is incomplete” because it overlooks “types of removal that take place in the shadows of 
immigration court”); see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE 
NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 52 (2012) (“[A] bewildering array of new fast-track mechanisms with 
such names as ‘expedited removal’ render much of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century 
story of deportation one of deformalization in which rights guaranteed since the late nineteenth 
century have been eliminated.” (emphasis in original)); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of 
Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6–14 (2014) (discussing 
expedited removal, reinstatement of removal, and administrative removal).  
45. See, e.g., Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of 
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
101, 102) (on file with author) (presenting “the first empirical analysis of asylum adjudication in 
family detention”); Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional 
Refugee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and Children 
at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 137, 140 (recommending that the United 
States government end family detention and “recognize the humanitarian crisis occurring in the 
Northern Triangle countries and the legitimate need of individuals from these countries for refugee 
protection”); Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes . . . Crowding in Upon Us”: The 
Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 OKLA. L. 
REV. 185, 186 (arguing that the detention of asylum-seeking families from Central America is “the 
modern iteration of Chae Chan Ping”); Stephen W. Manning, The Artesia Report, INNOVATION L. 
LAB, https://innovationlawlab.org/the-artesia-report/the-artesia-report/ [https://perma.cc/W6QP-B9 
AK] (describing pro bono response to detention and deportation policies in the family detention 
center in Artesia, New Mexico in 2014). 
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statutory and regulatory context, and identifies sources of error in the 
credible fear determination process. Part II explores the evolution of, and 
current practices surrounding, IJ review and RFRs. It demonstrates that 
IJ review was intended to prevent the wrongful expedited removal of 
asylum seekers with meritorious claims, and shows how the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR’s) guidance on the regulations 
governing IJ review has undermined that promise. Additionally, Part II 
examines the official guidance on RFRs. Part III discusses government 
data on negative credible fear determinations vacated through IJ review 
or RFRs, focusing on the family detention context. The data suggest that 
both methods of review play vital roles in preventing the expedited 
removal of individuals with potentially viable claims for protection. 
Part IV proposes reforms to fortify IJ review and RFRs. EOIR should 
allow counsel to advocate on behalf of clients during IJ review and 
should permit asylum seekers to introduce before the IJ information not 
disclosed during the credible fear interview. Moreover, USCIS should 
direct the Asylum Office to grant an asylum seeker’s RFR upon a 
showing that an official erred during the credible fear interview or that a 
second interview will yield new information about the asylum seeker’s 
claim. This Comment concludes by contending that IJ review and RFRs 
will consistently prevent erroneous expedited removals only when 
asylum seekers have greater access to counsel. 
I. LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN BACKGROUND TO THE 
CREDIBLE FEAR DETERMINATION PROCESS 
Credible fear determinations occur at the intersection of two statutory 
schemes: expedited removal, which subjects undocumented persons who 
seek to enter the United States to removal without a hearing; and 
asylum, a form of protection available to individuals who fear 
persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group. This Part begins by 
describing recent migration to the United States from Central America, 
which has rekindled criticisms of expedited removal as applied to 
asylum seekers. It then provides overviews of expedited removal and 
asylum, focusing on the credible fear determination process. This Part 
concludes by discussing the potential for error in credible fear 
interviews. 
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A. The Central American Refugee Crisis Has Brought Renewed 
Attention to Expedited Removal 
Since the summer of 2014, tens of thousands of families and 
unaccompanied children have requested humanitarian protection at the 
United States-Mexico border.46 Most families have migrated from the 
Northern Triangle of Central America, which includes Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras.47 They flee extortion and recruitment by 
criminal gangs, pervasive gender-related violence, and some of the 
highest homicide rates in the world.48 In fiscal year 2014, 68,445 family 
units presented or were apprehended at the United States’s southern 
border.49 The flow of asylum seekers slowed slightly in 2015, but the 
refugee crisis continues.50 Over 153,000 family units arrived at ports of 
entry in the southwestern border region in fiscal years 2016 and 2017.51 
                                                     
46. JONATHAN T. HISKY ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL 
AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS: WHY THEY ARE FLEEING AND HOW UNITED STATES POLICIES ARE 
FAILING TO DETER THEM 1 (2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/ 
files/research/understanding_the_centralamericanrefugeecrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2GL-JNWS] 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS].  
47. Id. Growing numbers of noncitizens from Haiti and countries in Africa and Asia have 
presented at the United States-Mexico border, as well. See, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, The Desperate 
Trek: The Sharp Rise in Non-Latin American Migrants Trying to Cross into the U.S. from Mexico, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fg-immigration-trek-america-
tijuana/ [https://perma.cc/4CYC-BVU5] (noting that in 2016 “some 15,000 migrants from outside 
Latin America passed through” the Mexican state of Baja California en route to the United States). 
48. UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 46, at 3; see also 
Kirk Semple, Fleeing Gangs, Central American Families Surge Toward U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/467esource/fleeing-gangs-central-american-fam 
ilies-surge-toward-us.html [https://perma.cc/CA98-B4ZT]; AM. BAR ASS’N, FAMILY IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION: WHY THE PAST CANNOT BE PROLOGUE 14 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/Immigration/FamilyDetentionReport2015.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PDQ-H7P8] (“Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle are among the highest in 
the world, with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras consistently reporting three of the five 
highest national murder rates.”); Central America: Femicides and Gender-Based Violence, CTR. 
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu//our-work/central-america-femici 
des-and-gender-based-violence [https://perma.cc/RZ35-PAP8] (noting that Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador have some of the world’s highest rates of violence against women and girls).  
49. Total Family Unit Apprehensions by Month, FY 2013–2017, U.S. BORDER PATROL (Dec. 
2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Dec/BP%20Total%20Month 
ly%20Family%20Units%20by%20Sector%2C%20FY13-FY17.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ59-WJBF] 
[hereinafter Total Family Unit Apprehensions].  
50. Musalo & Lee, supra note 45, at 139 (suggesting that the “temporary drop” in arriving asylum 
seekers in early 2015 “likely reflects [the United States’s] interdiction policies [in Mexico] rather 
than any ‘deterrent’ effect of harsh policies at or within [the United States’] own borders”).  
51. Total Family Unit Apprehensions, supra note 49. 
16 - Shattuck.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  9:00 PM 
468 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:459 
 
Most families appear to merit humanitarian relief.52 According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, persons “fleeing 
epidemic levels of violence, including gender-based violence, in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras . . . present a clear need for 
international protection.”53 
Nonetheless, in mid-2014, the Obama administration undertook “an 
aggressive deterrence strategy” to dissuade asylum seekers from fleeing 
the Northern Triangle for the United States.54 Federal officials launched 
a media campaign in Central America that emphasized the dangers of 
the journey through Mexico and suggested that persons escaping 
violence would “not get papers” in the United States.55 The federal 
government also aided operations in Mexico to apprehend Central 
American asylum seekers en route to the United States.56 Meanwhile, 
DHS escalated detention policies, contracting with private prison 
corporations to open two family detention centers in the border region.57 
Asylum-seeking families who in prior years would have been released 
before their hearings were detained on prohibitively high bonds, 
sometimes for months.58 As Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh 
                                                     
52. LARA DOMÍNGUEZ, ADRIENNE LEE & ELIZABETH LEISERSON, U.S. DETENTION AND 
REMOVAL OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS 1 (2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_first_-_immigration_detention_-
_final_-_20160620_for_publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/98DE-LBZY].  
53. WOMEN ON THE RUN, supra note 29, at 2. 
54. David Nakamura, Obama Calls for “Aggressive Deterrence Strategy” for Border Crossers, 
WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/06/30/ 
obama-calls-for-aggressive-deterrence-strategy-for-border-crossers/ [https://perma.cc/4MCA-UC 
WN]. 
55. Valerie Hamilton, How the US Is Trying to Deter Migrants from Central America—with 
Music, PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 17, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-17/how-marimba-
beat-helping-us-border-patrol-deter-migrants-coming-border [https://perma.cc/NYF8-9T9U]; 
UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 46, at 1. 
56. See ADAM ISACSON, MAUREEN MEYER & HANNAH SMITH, INCREASED ENFORCEMENT AT 
MEXICO’S SOUTHERN BORDER: AN UPDATE ON SECURITY, MIGRATION, AND U.S. ASSISTANCE 15–
18 (2015), https://www.wola.org/files/WOLA_Increased_Enforcement_at_Mexico’s_Southern_Bo 
rder_Nov2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3F7-2H7J].  
57. See Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largest-
immigration-detention-center-in-us.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8TMQ-V76D].  
58. See, e.g., A One-Week Snapshot: Human Rights First at Dilley Family Detention Facility 
Post-Flores Ruling, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/re 
source/one-week-snapshot-human-rights-first-dilley-family-detention-facility-post-flores-ruling 
[https://perma.cc/92YX-769G] (documenting forty cases in the Dilley family detention center in 
where “ICE officers set initial bonds at $7,000 to $9,500,” which the typical “indigent asylum-
seeking famil[y] cannot pay”); DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 15–16 n.65 
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Johnson explained, such measures were calculated to send a clear 
message to Central Americans seeking protecting in the United States: 
“we will send you back.”59 
The Obama administration’s deterrence strategy also relied on 
expedited removal.60 Created by IIRIRA, expedited removal allows 
individual immigration officers to order the removal, without 
administrative or judicial review, of a person found inadmissible at a 
port of entry or within 100 miles of a United States border.61 Before 
2014, the government declined to place families apprehended at or near 
the border into expedited removal proceedings.62 Parents with children 
were typically assigned to regular removal proceedings, which entail a 
hearing before an IJ, and given a notice to appear in immigration court at 
a later date.63 As migration continued to rise, however, DHS changed 
course. It began to place family units into expedited removal 
proceedings, partly to deter other families from seeking asylum in the 
United States.64 The strategy was of a piece with DHS’s widespread 
reliance on expedited removal during the Obama years. In total, over 
141,000 noncitizens were subjected to expedited removal in fiscal year 
2016, accounting for 41.6% of all removals from the United States.65 
Detention and expedited removal quickly became central to the 
Trump administration’s approach to border enforcement, as well. 
Among Donald Trump’s first actions as President was an executive 
order on “border security” in which he reiterated his administration’s 
commitment to enforcing expedited removal.66 In February 2017, 
                                                     
(collecting reports on disproportionately high bonds in family detention centers); Manning, supra 
note 45, at Part XI (stating that “[a] preliminary review” of the data gathered by a pro bono project 
at the family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, showed “that the mean bond amount set by 
the Headquarters immigration judges was $17,000” during the first several weeks of the facility’s 
existence).  
59. Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unaccompanied Children 
and Related Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Appropriations, 113th Cong. 14 (2014) 
(prepared statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec.) [hereinafter Surge 
Hearing].  
60. Taylor & Johnson, supra note 45, 193–201 (describing Obama administration’s use of 
expedited removal against Central American asylum seekers).  
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012); see infra section II.C. 
62. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. BAKER, supra note 22, at 8. 
66. Exec. Order 13,767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8793, 8796 (Jan. 30, 2017) (directing the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to 
“take appropriate action to apply, in his sole and unreviewable discretion, the provisions of 
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Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly issued a memorandum 
directing DHS to expand immigration detention, escalate its use of 
expedited removal, and “enhance” credible fear determinations.67 A few 
months later, the Trump administration terminated the Central American 
Minors refugee program, an Obama-era initiative that allowed parents 
with lawful status in the United States to petition for refugee status on 
behalf of children in the Northern Triangle.68 Advocates fear that such 
measures will jeopardize the claims for protection of bona fide asylum 
seekers from Central America and nations around the world.69 
B. “Credible Fear of Persecution” Is the Linchpin of an Asylum 
Claim 
Asylum is a form of humanitarian protection granted to a noncitizen 
who is present in the United States and qualifies as a “refugee” under 
United States law.70 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines 
                                                     
section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) of the INA to the aliens designated under 
section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)”). 
67. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), at 6–7, https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immig 
ration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG2D-3DKL] (claiming that “[t]he 
surge of illegal immigration at the southern border has overwhelmed federal agencies and resources 
and has created a significant national security vulnerability to the United States”). An internal DHS 
memo from July 2017 indicates that the Trump administration is considering proposals that would 
allow DHS to place into expedited removal proceedings noncitizens apprehended in the interior of 
the country who cannot prove that they have been present in the United States for at least ninety 
days. See Abigail Hauslohner & David Nakamura, In Memo, Trump Administration Weighs 
Expanding the Expedited Deportation Powers of DHS, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-memo-trump-administration-weighs-
expanding-the-expedited-deportation-powers-of-dhs/2017/07/14/ce5f16b4-68ba-11e7-9928 
22d00a47778f_story.html [https://perma.cc/73SJ-HAVC].  
68. U.S. Program for Central American Child Refugees to End Thursday, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-minors/u-s-program-for-central-america 
n-child-refugees-to-end-Thursday-idUSKBN1D905C [https://perma.cc/5KG5-7QK7].  
69. See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCH. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, THE IMPACT 
OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017), https://today.law. 
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Report-Impact-of-Trump-Executive-Orders-on-Asylum-
Seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY5S-PSBL] (arguing that President Trump’s executive orders of 
January 2017 “represent a dramatic restriction of access to asylum and other immigration 
protections in the United States”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASYLUM UNDER THREAT: IMPACT OF 
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S IMMIGRATION EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY’S MEMORANDA ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/ 
default/files/hrf-asylum-under-threat.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU5V-H7WF] (stating that the measures 
outlined in the executive orders “would multiply the many challenges already faced by refugees 
attempting to navigate the U.S. asylum process”).  
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2012). 
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a “refugee” as any person who is outside that person’s country of 
nationality and is “unable or unwilling to return to” that country 
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”71 Additionally, the INA codifies the United States’s 
nonrefoulement obligations under international law.72 In accord with the 
United Nations 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 
United States must refrain from removing a noncitizen to a country if the 
noncitizen’s “life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the” noncitizen’s “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”73 
The asylum application process takes either an affirmative or a 
defensive posture.74 Affirmative applicants apply for asylum after having 
entered the United States on a valid non-immigrant visa or without 
inspection.75 They thus identify themselves to DHS through their 
applications to USCIS, a division of DHS.76 In contrast, defensive 
applicants apply for asylum as a defense to removal, typically after being 
apprehended by DHS.77 Defensive claims are filed with EOIR, the 
division of the Department of Justice that houses the immigration 
courts.78 Persons who present at a port of entry without valid entry 
documents and are found to have a “credible fear of persecution” are 
placed into regular removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA, 
where they may assert defensive claims for protection.79 
The credible fear screening process effectively begins before an 
asylum seeker is referred to the Asylum Office for a credible fear 
interview. When individuals without entry documents arrive at the 
border or an airport, they undergo “secondary inspection[s]” by Customs 
                                                     
71. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  
72. See U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 30 (1967), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [https://perma.cc/2NRK-DZAF] 
(barring any country from “expel[ling] or return[ing] . . . a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened”).  
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (codifying the nonrefoulement standard).  
74. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 
796–97 (8th ed. 2016).  
75. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 305 (2007).  
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 305–06.  
78. Id. at 306.  
79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); id. § 1229a(a)(1).  
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and Border Protection (CBP), a division of DHS.80 During secondary 
inspections, CBP officers are required to read a brief statement that 
describes the protections available to foreign nationals who have 
suffered torture or persecution in their home countries.81 Additionally, 
officers must ask undocumented arrivals questions designed to shed light 
on their eligibility for asylum, and must record and read back the 
statements made in reply.82 If at any point an individual expresses intent 
to seek asylum or fear of returning home, the officer must detain and 
refer the individual for a credible fear interview with an asylum officer.83 
Credible fear interviews are intended to ferret out fraudulent and 
clearly nonviable asylum claims. The INA defines “credible fear of 
persecution” to mean “that there is a significant possibility, taking into 
account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of 
the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the 
alien could establish eligibility for asylum.”84 As USCIS’s Asylum 
Division Officer Training Course instructs, “the credible fear ‘significant 
possibility’ standard of proof can be best understood as requiring that the 
applicant ‘demonstrate a substantial and realistic possibility of 
succeeding,’ but not requiring the applicant to show that he or she is 
more likely than not going to succeed when before an immigration 
judge.”85 In making this determination, the asylum officer must consider 
                                                     
80. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 173; see also Michele R. Pistone & Phillip G. Schrag, 
The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 37 (2001).  
81. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 169. 
82. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2017). Specifically, officers must ask: (1) “Why did you 
leave your home country or country of last residence?” (2) “Do you have any fear or concern about 
being returned to your home country or being removed from the United States?” (3) “Would you be 
harmed if you are returned to your home country or country of last residence?” ALLEN KELLER ET 
AL., STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 13 (2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/ 
default/files/472esources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/evalCredibleFear.pdf [https://perma.cc/N52E-
XKYA].  
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (stating that if an applicant “indicates an 
intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture,” the “examining 
immigration officer shall record sufficient information in the sworn statement to establish and 
record that the alien has indicated such intention, fear, or concern”). 
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); see also Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention 
and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 
10,312, 10,317 (Mar. 6, 1997) (stating that federal immigration officials would be trained to “ensure 
that the [credible fear] standard is implemented in a way which will encourage flexibility and a 
broad application of the statutory standard”).  
85. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE, 
CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 16 (2017) https://drive.google. 
com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxY0FCczROOFZ4SVk/edit [https://perma.cc/56Z3-REVH] [hereinafter 
2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR].  
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whether the asylum seeker’s case “presents novel or unique issues that 
merit consideration in a full hearing before an immigration judge,” as 
well as the “credibility” of the asylum seeker.86 Credibility may be 
informed by the consistency of the asylum seeker’s statements during 
the credible fear interview with those made to the inspecting CBP 
officer, the level of detail contained in the asylum seeker’s statements, 
and the asylum seeker’s “demeanor, candor, and responsiveness.”87 
DHS has adopted a number of regulations intended to ensure that 
bona fide asylum seekers are spared expedited removal.88 The asylum 
officer must “conduct the [credible fear] interview in a nonadversarial 
manner, separate and apart from the general public.”89 If the asylum 
officer determines that an individual “is unable to participate effectively 
in the interview because of illness, fatigue, or other impediments, the 
officer may reschedule the interview.”90 Additionally, the asylum officer 
must ensure that the asylum seeker “has an understanding of the credible 
fear determination process” before proceeding with the interview.91 
Interpretation services must be provided if the asylum seeker is “unable 
to proceed effectively in English” and the officer “is unable to proceed 
competently in a language chosen by the alien.”92 At the end of the 
interview, the asylum officer must create “a summary of the material 
facts as stated by the applicant,” and is required to “review the summary 
with the alien and provide the alien with an opportunity to correct any 
errors therein.”93 A negative credible fear determination is not final until 
approved by a supervisory officer.94 Finally, as discussed in more detail 
below, an asylum seeker who has received a negative credible fear 
determination may ask an IJ to review that determination before being 
removed.95 
In theory, these measures ensure that persons with meritorious claims 
are allowed to present their cases in immigration courts; in practice, their 
uneven execution makes noncitizens vulnerable to erroneous removals.96 
                                                     
86. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(2)–(4).  
87. 2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR, supra note 85, at 18–23.  
88. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 169.  
89. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d). 
90. Id. § 208.30(d)(l). 
91. Id. § 208.30(d)(2). 
92. Id. § 208.30(d)(5). 
93. Id. § 208.30(d)(6); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(iii)(II) (2012). 
94. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(7). 
95. See infra section II.A.  
96. See infra section I.D.  
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The next section examines expedited removal, the fast track to 
deportation that asylum seekers face when the credible fear interview’s 
procedural safeguards fail. 
C. Expedited Removal Allows Immigration Officers to Order 
Individuals Removed from the United States, Typically Without 
Administrative or Judicial Review 
Expedited removal is a summary and ostensibly efficient process; it 
deputizes individual immigration officers near borders and ports of entry 
to issue removal orders against individuals found ineligible to enter the 
United States. This section examines the purposes of expedited removal, 
the types of noncitizens who are subjected to expedited removal, and the 
limitations on judicial review of expedited removal orders. 
1. Individuals Who Lack Valid Entry Documents May Face Expedited 
Removal 
IIRIRA, which implemented expedited removal, took effect on April 
1, 1997.97 Before that date, undocumented persons apprehended inside 
the United States were deemed “deportable,” and were placed in 
“deportation” proceedings.98 In contrast, individuals who arrived at a 
United States port of entry without valid entry documents were deemed 
“excludable,” and were placed in exclusion proceedings.99 Persons 
alleged to be excludable were entitled to an individualized hearing in an 
immigration court.100 They enjoyed the right to retain counsel and could 
testify, present witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses before the IJ.101 
Asylum seekers in exclusion proceedings were not required to establish 
                                                     
97. For a discussion of the major changes in immigration law that IIRIRA introduced, as well as 
the political climate in which it was adopted, see U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of 
Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349 (2005).  
98. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982). 
99. See id. (“The deportation hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien already 
physically in the United States, and the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against 
an alien outside the United States seeking admission.”). 
100. Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening Under the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1501, 1502 
(1997).  
101. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a) (1994); Cooper, supra note 100, at 1502 (noting that 
proceedings before an immigration court resemble “the classic common law adversarial model”). 
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a “credible fear of persecution” in a screening interview before being 
afforded a full hearing in immigration court.102 
IIRIRA dramatically changed the procedures that govern the 
inspection and removal of persons arriving at a United States port of 
entry. Animating the Act were concerns among lawmakers and 
immigration officials that the immigration system was crippled by 
administrative backlogs and rife with abuses, including frivolous asylum 
claims.103 IIRIRA was intended to promote efficiency, shore up the 
southern border, and assuage national security concerns.104 As a 1996 
House Judiciary Committee report explained, “[O]ur immigration laws 
should enable the prompt admission of those who are entitled to be 
admitted, the prompt exclusion or removal of those who are not so 
entitled, and the clear distinction between these categories.”105 
To that end, IIRIRA authorizes individual immigration officials to 
remove two categories of “inadmissible aliens” without a hearing: 
noncitizens who attempt to obtain admission to the United States by 
means of fraud or material misrepresentation,106 and noncitizens who 
lack valid entry documents.107 Persons may be expeditiously removed if 
they present at a United States port of entry, such as an airport or a 
border patrol station, and fall into one of these two categories.108 
Additionally, expedited removal applies to individuals who are present 
in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, are 
apprehended within 100 miles of an international border, and cannot 
prove that that they have been physically present in the United States for 
the preceding fourteen days.109 In contrast to regular removal 
                                                     
102. An Overview of Asylum Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 14 (2001) (statement of Karen Musalo, Hastings College of the Law). 
103. See Cooper, supra note 100, at 1501. 
104. See Lofgren, supra note 97, at 351–52 (describing the national media’s focus on 
immigration fraud after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing). 
105. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 111 (1996).  
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (2012) (deeming inadmissible “[a]ny alien who, by fraud or 
willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) 
a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States”). 
107. See id. § 1182(a)(7) (deeming inadmissible “any immigrant at the time of application for 
admission who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border 
crossing identification card, or other valid entry document . . . and a valid unexpired passport”).  
108. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I)–(II). The statute grants the Attorney General the authority to 
expand by regulation the scope of expedited removal to individuals apprehended inside the United 
States without having been admitted or paroled who cannot establish that they have been 
continuously present for two or more years.  
109. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,878 (Aug. 11, 
2004) (extending expedited removal provisions to persons apprehended within 100 miles of the 
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proceedings under section 240 of the INA, expedited removal 
proceedings are severely abbreviated. If an immigration officer 
determines that a person satisfies the criteria for expedited removal, and 
that person does not express intent to apply for asylum or fear of 
persecution, then “the officer shall order the alien removed from the 
United States without further hearing or review.”110 
Given its summary nature, expedited removal places enormous 
authority in the hands of frontline immigration officers. As immigration 
advocates pointed out after IIRIRA was adopted, the expedited removal 
invests in “relatively untrained” officials “a power previously given only 
to highly trained immigration judges: to return people to the land from 
which they came.”111 Indeed, in expedited removal proceedings CBP 
officers “serve as both prosecutor and judge—often investigating, 
charging, and making a decision all within the course of one day.”112 
Even as it devolved the authority to remove noncitizens, IIRIRA 
heightened the costs of removal for noncitizens. A person subjected to 
expedited removal is barred from reentering the United States—even as 
a visitor—for a period of five years.113 And a person previously ordered 
expeditiously removed who seeks to enter the United States in violation 
of the five-year bar is ineligible for most forms of relief under the INA, 
including asylum.114 Expedited removal thus has serious long-term 
consequences for people who may face persecution in their home 
countries and seek to return to the United States in the future.115 
                                                     
southern border); Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland Security 
Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30, 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/ 
?view&did=476965 [https://perma.cc/SK59-UPHK] (announcing expansion of expedited removal 
to apply to individuals apprehended within 100 miles of the northern border).  
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).  
111. PHILLIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE 
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 196 (2000); see also Ramji, supra note 35, at 135 (“[P]otentially 
life-threatening decisions are made by immigration officers, whose untrained judgments are 
ineligible for review by any court or judicial body.”).  
112. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE GROWTH OF SUMMARY 
DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
sites/default/files/research h/removal_without_recourse.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCS-62KP]. 
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). 
114. Id.  
115. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 18, at 37–38 (describing the experience of Elena, a Honduran 
citizen who was subjected to expedited removal after receiving a negative credible fear 
determination, was tortured in Honduras after being removed, and was barred from applying for 
asylum because of the prior expedited removal order).  
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The humanitarian criticisms of expedited removal came swiftly, and 
two decades later show no signs of abating.116 Some observers and 
human rights advocates have contended that expedited removal puts the 
United States in violation of its statutory and international law 
obligations; they insist that the system needs dramatic reform, if not 
wholesale repeal.117 But today, it seems safe to say, expedited removal is 
here to stay: Republican and Democratic administrations alike have 
made expedited removal a centerpiece of their border enforcement 
policies, and Congress has never seriously considered repealing the 
regime.118 If the Trump administration’s 2017 executive actions are any 
indication, expedited removal will become even more entrenched in the 
coming years.119 
Inherent to expedited removal is a “conflict between speedy decision-
making and fair and accurate decision-making.”120 This tension is 
especially evident in the limits IIRIRA imposes on judicial review of 
expedited removal orders. 
2. A Noncitizen Ordered Expeditiously Removed Typically Lacks 
Recourse to Administrative or Judicial Review 
Expedited removal orders are effectively immune from administrative 
and judicial review. IIRIRA bars the “administrative appeal” of an 
expedited removal order, except where a person claims to have been 
admitted for permanent residence, to already possess refuge or asylee 
                                                     
116. See, e.g., Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 170–71 (describing early calls for 
elimination of expedited removal); Manning, supra note 45 (reprising similar criticisms of 
expedited removal in the context of present-day Central American migration).  
117. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 170 (“As early as 1999 . . . the Advisory 
Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, which reported to the Secretary of State and to the 
President of the United States, called for the ‘[r]epeal of expedited removal,’ noting that repeal 
‘should be a high priority.’”). Over fifty organizations, including Amnesty International, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights Watch, joined the Lawyers Committee’s call 
for repeal. Id. at 171 n.18 (discussing THE LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IS THIS 
AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS IN AMERICA, app. 4 (2000) (calling 
for repeal of expedited removal)).  
118. See, e.g., Hauslohner & Nakamura, supra note 67 (noting that the Obama administration 
maintained the Bush administration’s expedited removal guidelines).  
119. Id. (describing the Trump administration’s proposal to apply expedited removal to 
noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States who cannot prove they have been present 
for at least ninety days); see also Exec. Order 13,767, Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8796 (Jan. 30, 2017).  
120. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 168 (stating that “the inherent conflict between speedy 
decision-making and accurate and fair decision-making was well understood” when IIRIRA was 
adopted). 
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status, or to be a United States citizen.121 Similarly, federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to review the merits of an expedited removal order,122 “any 
other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or 
operation” of an expedited removal order,123 or “a decision by the 
Attorney General to invoke the provisions” that activate expedited 
removal.124 Accordingly, no court may issue relief in an action 
pertaining to an expedited removal order.125 
Moreover, IIRIRA largely strips Article III courts of jurisdiction of 
habeas corpus proceedings that arise from expedited removal orders. 
Federal courts may only exercise habeas review of an expedited removal 
order to determine three distinct inquiries: whether the petitioner is a 
noncitizen; whether the petitioner was ordered expeditiously removed; 
and whether the petitioner possesses status as a lawful permanent 
resident, refugee, or asylee.126 A court that adjudicates an expedited 
removal-related habeas claim thus may consider whether an order was 
issued against the petitioner; however, it lacks jurisdiction to ask if the 
petitioner is actually inadmissible or merits a form of immigration 
relief.127 
Systemic challenges to expedited removal have floundered. Shortly 
after IIRIRA took effect, the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association timely filed an action challenging the regime’s legality and 
constitutionality.128 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
Association and other immigrant rights organizations lacked third-party 
standing to raise statutory or constitutional claims on behalf of persons 
                                                     
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
122. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).  
123. Id.   
124. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii).  
125. Id. § 1252(e)(1)(A). Nor may a court certify a class in a suit challenging expedited removal. 
See id. § 1252(e)(1)(B). 
126. Id. § 1252(e)(2). 
127. See, e.g., Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 2015) (court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider petition for review of expedited removal where petitioner did not raise any claim listed in 
the statutory exceptions to the bar against judicial review); Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 
2001) (under IIRIRA, judicial review of an expedited removal order following a person’s attempted 
entry into United States is limited to whether an order has in fact been issued and whether petitioner 
is the same person subject to the order); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 220 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) 
(“The habeas corpus proceeding shall not address whether the alien is actually admissible or entitled 
to any relief from removal.”).  
128. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
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subjected to expedited removal.129 Because IIRIRA requires that 
challenges to its provisions be filed within sixty days of implementation, 
the court’s decision to dismiss the Association’s suit cemented the 
statutory framework that governs expedited removal.130 
In subsequent years, advocates attempted to use habeas petitions as 
vehicles to challenge the constitutionality of expedited removal, 
particularly as it applies to asylum seekers.131 Most recently, in Castro v. 
Department of Homeland Security,132 twenty-eight Central American 
families who faced expedited removal filed habeas petitions in federal 
district court.133 The plaintiffs, women and children who claimed to have 
fled persecution in their home countries, received negative credible fear 
determinations when they arrived in the United States.134 Citing 
deficiencies in their credible fear interviews, the plaintiffs argued that 
DHS had violated their Fifth Amendment procedural due process 
rights.135 Additionally, the plaintiffs maintained that IIRIRA’s 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions violate the Suspension Clause of the 
United States Constitution.136 The Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action.137 It held that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the 
protections of the Suspension Clause do not extend to noncitizens in 
expedited removal proceedings.138 The fate of Castro and other habeas 
                                                     
129. Id. at 1363–64. According to the court, “It would be inconsistent with the ‘properly limited 
role of the courts’ for us to use [the sixty-day deadline] provision as the basis for expanding 
jurisdiction through the back door of third party standing.” Id. at 1364. 
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)–(B); see H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 220 (“This limited provision 
for judicial review does not extend to determinations of credible fear and removability in the case of 
individual aliens, which are not reviewable.”). 
131. See, e.g., Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1140–42 (9th Cir. 
2008) (court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition collaterally attacking expedited removal order); 
M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1165–66 (D.N.M. 2014) (IIRIRA’s 
restrictions on habeas review did not violate Suspension Clause rights of petitioner, an asylum 
seeker who received a negative credible fear determination and was ordered expeditiously 
removed); Diaz Rodriguez v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 14-CV-2716, 2014 WL 4675182, at 
*3–4 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2014) (court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition challenging 
expedited removal order, even though petitioner alleged procedural and substantive deficiencies in 
his credible fear interview). 
132. 163 F. Supp. 3d 157 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).  
133. Id. at 158. 
134. Castro, 835 F.3d at 428. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 429.  
137. Id. at 425.  
138. Id.  
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challenges suggest that the statutory bases of the expedited removal 
regime are impervious to judicial review, even when asylum seekers 
claim that expedited removal would threaten their lives or liberty.139 
D. The Credible Fear Determination Process is Fraught with 
Potential for Error 
The asylum-seeking families at the center of Castro all claimed to 
have escaped gang-related or sexual violence in the Northern 
Triangle.140 Laura Flores-Pichinte fled with her young daughter after her 
partner raped her and physically abused her and her daughter.141 Maria 
Martinez Nolasco escaped after a gang leader sexually assaulted her and 
threatened to kidnap her son in retaliation for her decision to reject his 
advances.142 Lesly Griscelda Cruz Matamoros sought asylum with her 
twelve-year-old daughter after gang members made sexual threats 
against her daughter.143 Once in the United States, they and other 
families with similar claims were deemed not to have credible fears of 
persecution.144 In challenging their expedited removal orders, the Castro 
families asserted that their credible fear interviews were infected by 
official noncompliance and procedural errors.145 For example, the 
families alleged that the asylum officers who conducted the interviews 
failed to provide written explanations of their negative credible fear 
determinations; rather, the officers “simply checked a box on a form 
stating that the applicant did not meet a particular legal requirement, 
without any explanation,” impeding the families’ ability to challenge the 
officers’ conclusions.146 They also argued that asylum officers applied a 
heightened standard for gauging credible fear, instead of the “significant 
possibility” threshold mandated by statute.147 
                                                     
139. But see Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause after Boumediene v. 
Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 577 (2010) (arguing that the statutory preclusion of judicial review 
“of issues of law arising in expedited removal from the interior [of the United States] . . . violates 
the Suspension Clause” (emphasis omitted)).  
140. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., __ U.S. __, 137 
S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812).  
141. Id. at 12.  
142. Id.  
143. Id.  
144. Id. at 12–13.  
145. Id. at 13.  
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
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The Castro plaintiffs’ habeas claims alleged deficiencies in the 
credible fear determination process that human rights advocates and 
other observers have documented since expedited removal’s inception. 
This section examines those deficiencies. It then discusses recent USCIS 
guidance on credible fear interviews, which appears to elevate the 
burden an asylum seeker must satisfy to avoid expedited removal. 
1. A Credible Fear Determination May Be Affected by Official 
Noncompliance, Inadequate Interpretation, and the Absence of 
Representation 
As recent reports by the American Immigration Council, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, and other 
organizations demonstrate, the credible fear determination process 
produces uneven and often arbitrary results.148 Two sets of factors 
elevate the risk of error. First, frontline immigration officers fail to 
comply consistently with safeguards designed to ensure that bona fide 
asylum seekers are spared expedited removal.149 Second, circumstances 
beyond asylum seekers’ control, including the absence of counsel and 
the effects of trauma, disability, or untreated medical needs, may 
compromise credible fear determinations.150 
In some cases, CBP officers’ noncompliance with the requirements of 
secondary inspections heightens the risk that asylum seekers will fail 
their credible fear interviews.151 During the credible fear interview, the 
asylum officer must take into account the consistency of the asylum 
seeker’s statements with those made to CBP during secondary 
inspection.152 A 2016 report by the U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, a governmental entity tasked with studying the 
impact of expedited removal on asylum seekers, documented numerous 
                                                     
148. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS 
THE COURTROOM (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/120214-expeditedremova 
l_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH4F-VNUW] [hereinafter AMERICAN EXILE]; ELIZABETH CASSIDY & 
TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE 
TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2016), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/def 
ault/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8PJ-VMCE] [hereinafter USCIRF 
2016 REPORT]; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND PREVENT ABUSE AT THE 
BORDER: BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY (2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
sites/default/files/Asylum-on-the-Border-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A5U-YG5P] [hereinafter HOW 
TO PROTECT REFUGEES]; SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34.  
149. USCIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 20–23.  
150. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 8–22.  
151. See AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 148, at 41. 
152. See 2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR, supra note 85, at 18–23. 
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cases in which CBP officers failed to record accurately asylum seekers’ 
answers to questions about their fears of persecution.153 In three of the 
five credible fear interviews the Commission observed, “asylum seekers’ 
I-867 forms indicated ‘no’ answers to the fear questions in his or her 
[border patrol] interview, but the asylum seeker said that s/he had 
articulated a fear or was not asked.”154 Moreover, asylum seekers 
reported that CBP officers “inquired into their fear claims in detail, 
and/or dismissed assertions of fear,” failed to read asylum seekers’ 
statements back to them, and “pressured” asylum seekers to sign their 
statements.155 One officer even told the Commission “he only reads back 
the contents if the interviewee requests it because it takes too long.”156 
Such noncompliance not only makes it more likely that an asylum seeker 
will be removed without a credible fear interview, but also increases the 
odds of an adverse credibility finding during the interview itself.157 
Furthermore, the thoroughness and quality of credible fear interviews 
vary dramatically between asylum officers and detention centers. The 
family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, which opened in June 
2014, provides an illustrative example. Between September 2013 and 
June 2014, approximately 77% of asylum seekers who underwent 
credible fear interviews nationwide received positive determinations.158 
In contrast, just 37.8% of the families detained in Artesia received 
positive credible fear determinations in June and the first part of July 
2014.159 Pro bono attorneys and other visitors to Artesia reported that 
officials unevenly applied the substantive and procedural safeguards 
intended to protect asylum seekers with potentially viable claims.160 As 
one Human Rights First attorney explained, “I met with families, 
including victims of domestic violence, who had cases that met the legal 
standard for asylum, yet did not pass a credible fear screening.”161 
                                                     
153. USCIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 21 (noting that CBP officers often recorded 
identical, “clearly erroneous” answers during secondary inspection).  
154. Id.  
155. Id.; AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 148, at 39.  
156. USCIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 20 n.25. 
157. See AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 148, at 41.  
158. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT 
SUMMARY: FY 2014, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Credible_Fear_and 
_Reasonable_Fear_FY14_Q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XNU-8GZD].  
159. Complaint at 31, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).  
160. See Manning, supra note 45, Part III.  
161. Lawsuit Challenges Credible Fear Process for Immigrant Families Held in Artesia 
Detention Facility, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-
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Asylum officers “misappl[ied] the [credible fear] standard,” neglected to 
“prob[e] the asylum seeker for enough detail,” and “conduct[ed] 
interviews with the asylum seeker’s minor children in the room.”162 
Similar problems have plagued credible fear interviews of women and 
children held in the family detention center in Dilley, Texas.163 
According to Shalyn Fluharty, managing attorney of the Dilley Pro Bono 
Project, the strength and nature of an asylum seeker’s claim bear less on 
the outcome of a credible fear interview than “the asylum officer [the 
applicant] happen[s] to draw and the Asylum Office supervisor.”164 
Additionally, immigration officials may fail to furnish adequate 
interpretation services during the credible fear interview, contrary to the 
regulations.165 Interpretation is typically provided through telephone or 
video.166 The flaws of remote interpretation are well documented: 
technological glitches impede communication and lead to erroneous 
interpretation; telephonic interpreters are less likely to gain the trust of 
the non-English-speaking party; and interpreters cannot see when a 
speaker is confused or scared.167 Speakers of “rare” or indigenous 
languages face especially high barriers to effective communication with 
asylum officers.168 A DHS Advisory Committee recently concluded that 
indigenous asylum seekers’ cases “are probably not receiving fair 
processing” because DHS “systematically fails to provide appropriate 




163. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34. 
164. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, Managing Attorney, Dilley Pro Bono Project 
(Jan. 8, 2018). 
165. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(5) (2017); DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 96.  
166. See DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 95–97. 
167. Id. at 97; Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 
941 (2015).  
168. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 140. In Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley’s study on 
family detention, “[f]amily detainees were . . . more likely to speak indigenous languages than the 
rest of the detained population. In [their] family detention sample, 635 detainees (4% of the total) 
spoke an indigenous Mexican, Central, or South American language.” Id. at 142. In 2013, the 
Asylum Office began dispensing with credible fear determinations for rare language speakers for 
whom interpretation could not be found within forty-eight hours, opting to serve such individuals 
with a notice to appear in immigration court for section 240 removal proceedings. Id. at 141 n.193. 
DHS has failed to implement that policy consistently, at least in the Dilley family detention center. 
Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164. Since late 2017, the Houston Asylum 
Office has conducted numerous credible fear interviews of rare language speakers without adequate 
interpretation. In one case, the Asylum Office attempted to interview an indigenous language 
speaker no less than thirteen times before issuing a notice to appear. Id.  
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language access” for such individuals.169 In one illustrative case, a 
Guatemalan woman detained in Texas was interviewed in Spanish, 
rather than her native indigenous language.170 “Her credible fear 
interview notes demonstrated that the asylum officer understood a 
particular event took place on ten occasions; but the woman maintains 
she was referring to ten perpetrators. Before she could secure legal 
counsel, she was removed.”171 In other cases involving speakers of 
indigenous or rare languages, credible fear interviews have quite literally 
“resemble[d] a game of telephone”: the asylum seeker communicates 
telephonically with a speaker of the rare language, who then 
communicates telephonically with a Spanish interpreter, who in turn 
conveys telephonically the information to the asylum officer.172 
Compounding these problems, asylum seekers rarely enjoy the benefit 
of legal counsel before or during credible fear screenings.173 Like all 
noncitizens in removal proceedings, asylum seekers have no right to 
publicly funded legal counsel at any stage in the asylum application 
process.174 Asylum seekers are subjected to mandatory detention 
between secondary inspection and the credible fear interview, severely 
impeding their ability to access representation.175 Barriers to 
representation are acute in the family detention context. As Professor 
Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer, and Jana Whalley show in their 
forthcoming study on family detention, “[a]ll five family detention 
centers used from 2001 to 2016 were located in small or rural cities, with 
populations of only a few thousand” and limited social and legal 
                                                     
169. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 99, 79.  
170. Brief of Refugee and Human Rights Organizations and Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 15, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-
812).  
171. Id.  
172. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 98. The barriers to fair processing faced 
by speakers of rare languages are so high that the DHS Advisory Committee recommended that 
such persons “should not be detained, but should rather be released with a Notice to Appear, on 
their own recognizance or with the support of a case management support program.” Id. at 80.  
173. See Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 131–36. Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley found 
that just 23% of asylum seekers in family detention centers had legal representation during IJ review 
of their negative credible or reasonable fear determinations. Id. at 134. Presumably, even fewer 
asylum seekers, in both family and non-family detention, have legal counsel during the credible fear 
interview itself. See also HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 148, at 8. 
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National 
Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (“[I]mmigrants 
have a right to counsel in immigration court, but not at the expense of the government.”). 
175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (asylum seekers “shall be detained pending a final 
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if not found to have such a fear, until removed”); 
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (2017).  
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services.176 Valiant pro bono efforts, such as the Artesia Project, the 
CARA Pro Bono Project, and ALDEA, have expanded asylum-seeking 
families’ access to legal advice in detention.177 But ICE and private 
prison personnel have repeatedly encumbered legal representatives’ 
ability to consult with detained asylum seekers.178 And even in detention 
centers with pro bono services, some asylum seekers enter their credible 
fear interviews without having met with an attorney or attended legal 
presentations on the asylum process.179 
Absence of legal counsel matters; asylum seekers who do not 
understand the purpose or nature of a credible fear interview, or 
expedited removal generally, cannot be assumed to be aware of the 
information an asylum officer would find helpful to assessing their 
claims.180 CBP is required to give asylum seekers a form that explains 
the credible fear process.181 This document is sure to be unintelligible to 
an asylum seeker who does not read or write. And in some ports of 
entry, the form may not be available in languages other than English or 
Spanish.182 Unsurprisingly, according to the U.S. Commission on 
                                                     
176. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 129.  
177. See id. at 132–33; Manning, supra note 45 (describing the Artesia Project). The Dilley Pro 
Bono Project, formerly the CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, serves protection-seeking 
mothers and children detained in Dilley, Texas. The project began as a collaboration between the 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, the American Immigration Council, the Refugee and 
Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, and the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association. See Who, CARA PRO BONO PROJECT, http://caraprobono.org/partners/ [https:// 
perma.cc/NHQ4-UAR6]. ALDEA, a pro bono project based in Reading, Pennsylvania, serves 
families detained in the Berks County Residential Center. See About Us, ALDEA—THE PEOPLE’S 
JUST. CTR., https://aldeapjc.org [https://perma.cc/AJV4-MQWG].  
178. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 130–31; Complaint, Dilley Pro Bono Project v. 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 1-17-cv-01055 (D.D.C. Jun. 1, 2017) (challenging ICE’s 
revocation of pro bono project legal assistant’s access to Dilley detention center); Letter from 
CARA Pro Bono Project to Megan Mack & John Roth, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/coercion-intimidation-detained-mothers-
children/complaint-regarding-residential-center-in-dilley [https://perma.cc/7TY5-26DJ] (submitting 
a “Complaint Regarding Coercion and Violations of the Right to Counsel at the South Texas Family 
Residential Center in Dilley, Texas”). 
179. See HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 148, at 8 (“Even [in detention centers] where 
[legal orientation] presentations exist, asylum seekers are generally not provided with legal 
presentations until after they have passed their credible fear interviews, and their cases are pending 
before the immigration courts.” (emphasis in original)).  
180. Asylum Hearing, supra note 27, at 134 (statement of Mary Meg McCarthy, Executive 
Director, Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center) (“When individuals do not fully 
understand the legal process or their rights, the CFI [credible fear interview] process is more likely 
to erroneously exclude bona fide asylum seekers rather than permit entry to fraudulent applicants.”).  
181. USIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 50.  
182. Id. (describing case in which French-speaking asylum seeker received credible fear 
information in English).  
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International Religious Freedom, “[o]ne overriding impression from [the 
Commission’s] interviews of detained asylum seekers is their 
insufficient understanding of what is happening to them in the Expedited 
Removal process, and the fear, stress and uncertainty that this causes.”183 
Such fear, stress, and uncertainty may be aggravated by the credible 
fear interview itself. Asylum law is notoriously complex. Although 
asylum officers are instructed to avoid legalese during interviews, 
asylum seekers are not always asked to explain their fears in lay terms. 
As one complaint, filed in 2014 on behalf of Central American mothers 
and children detained in Artesia, documented, “mothers have been 
asked, and are expected to be able to accurately answer, questions such 
as, ‘Have you ever been harmed or threatened in El Salvador because 
you belong to a group that is seen as different or special by society in 
your home country?’ or ‘Are you a member of a particular social 
group?’”184 One plaintiff, who had fled persecution by a criminal gang, 
“thought that she was being asked whether she belonged to a group of 
criminals or delinquents.”185 She received a negative credible fear 
determination.186 This mother’s experience is not atypical among asylum 
seekers who lack the benefit of counsel before the credible fear 
interview.187 
Whether or not they retain counsel, asylum seekers often confront an 
additional barrier: the effects of trauma. Asylum seekers suffer from 
post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and other 
psychological conditions at rates significantly higher than the general 
population.188 These conditions may undermine an asylum seeker’s 
                                                     
183. Id.  
184. Complaint at 27, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014). The 
Artesia detention center closed in December 2014, and plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their 
complaint on Jan. 30, 2015.  
185. Id.  
186. Id.  
187. See id. at 27–28 (describing cases where asylum seekers received negative credible fear 
determinations after being asked to explain their fears of persecution in legal terms); Wil S. Hylton, 
The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.ht 
ml?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6SEZ-U7H2] (documenting case where IJ affirmed negative 
credible fear determination after the asylum seeker told him she did not belong to a particular 
“social group”).  
188. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION 233 (2002), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
3d98623a4.html [https://perma.cc/723C-MBH2] (citing clinical studies that found rates of PTSD in 
refugees ranged between 39% and 100%, compared to 1% for the general population); Letter from 
CARA Pro Bono Project to Megan Mack & John Roth, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 2 (Mar. 28, 2016), 
http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2016/cara-crcl-complaint-concerns-regarding-
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claim in multiple ways.189 First, people who have suffered severe 
physical or psychological abuse or persecution may struggle to recount 
their history in linear fashion, lessening their “credibility” in the view of 
an asylum officer trained to evaluate a claim on the basis of the 
interviewee’s consistency.190 Moreover, asylum seekers may fear 
disclosing why they fled to the United States.191 Women escaping 
gender-related violence, for example, often hesitate to tell male officials 
about the abuse they have suffered.192 Such trauma may be exacerbated 
by the “inhumane conditions” that asylum seekers experience in CBP 
“holding cells” along the southern border, while awaiting transfer to 
detention centers.193 According to one recent report, untreated medical 
problems, including “physical manifestations of psychological 
trauma . . . regularly inhibit detained mothers and children from fully 
describing in their credible fear interviews their past experiences and 
fears of future persecution.”194 
                                                     
detention [https://perma.cc/H5NH-GMQ4] [hereinafter CARA Project Complaint to DHS] 
(complaint with respect to “Ongoing Concerns regarding the Detention and Fast-Track Removal of 
Children and Mothers Experiencing Symptoms of Trauma”) (“[M]any detained families suffer from 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, or other emotional or cognitive 
disorders.”). 
189. See SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 9.  
190. See, e.g., Derrick Silove, Zachary Steel & Charles Watters, Policies of Deterrence and the 
Mental Health of Asylum Seekers, 284 JAMA 604, 605 (2000) (“Asylum seekers with symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression may experience psychological dissociation 
under pressure and in such an altered state of awareness may fail to give appropriate answers.”); 
JULIAN GOJER & ADAM ELLIS, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND THE REFUGEE 
DETERMINATION PROCESS IN CANADA: STARTING THE DISCOURSE 10 (2014), http://www.unhcr. 
org/53356b349.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3PQ-F56V] (“Recent studies have demonstrated that mental 
health, including PTSD, can have an adverse effect on asylum seeker testimony and their ability to 
develop and produce ‘credible’ legal/medical evidence.” (citation omitted)).  
191. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 4. Shalyn Fluharty emphasizes the role 
of trauma in negative credible fear determinations in the Dilley family detention center. Asylum 
seekers who fail their credible fear interviews tend to “avoid [discussing] the most traumatic 
incidents of harm” during their interviews, “which often are the incidents most important to their 
case[s].” Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164. 
192. See SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 4; Letter on Due Process 
Violations, supra note 1, at 2.  
193. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE FREEZER: ABUSIVE CONDITIONS FOR WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN IN U.S. IMMIGRATION HOLDING CELLS 7 (2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
report_pdf/uscrd0218_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CG5-X3X9] (noting that “[u]ndocumented 
families taken into custody by US immigration agents at or near the US-Mexico border are 
generally placed in holding cells for several hours to several days, and sometimes a week or more”). 
The holding cells are often referred to as “hieleras (‘freezers’),” because they are “uncomfortably 
cold.” Id. at 1–2. A 2015 “mental health assessment” found that “[t]ime in CBP holding cells” was 
“the most difficult and traumatic period of detention for women and children.” Id. at 3 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
194. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 13. 
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In sum, the protections built into the credible fear process do not 
always function as they should. Official noncompliance during 
secondary inspections increases the risk of adverse credibility findings 
during the credible fear interview. Inadequate interpretation, lack of 
legal counsel, and the effects of trauma may also foil an asylum seeker’s 
credible fear determination. 
2. Recent USCIS Guidance on Credible Fear Interviews Appears to 
Heighten the “Significant Possibility” Standard 
By design, the credible fear interview is not a full-blown asylum 
hearing. As the Department of Justice explained when expedited 
removal took effect, “[t]he credible fear standard sets a low threshold of 
proof of potential entitlement to asylum; many [noncitizens] who have 
passed the credible fear standard will not ultimately be granted 
asylum.”195 In recent years, however, asylum experts have argued that 
new USCIS guidance has effectively elevated the threshold of proof 
required to support a positive credible fear finding.196 Those criticisms 
have centered on revisions to the Asylum Office’s credible fear lesson 
plans, which train asylum officers to conduct credible fear interviews.197 
In February 2014, citing an uptick in credible fear referrals, USCIS 
issued a revised lesson plan on credible fear determinations.198 The 
revisions included a new, three-part test that asylum officers must use 
                                                     
195. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of 
Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (Mar. 6, 1997).  
196. See, e.g., TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., SUMMARY OF FEBRUARY 13, 2017 ASYLUM DIVISION 
LESSON PLAN IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDERS: POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON SURVIVORS OF 
DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (2017), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
03/Tahirih-Summary-of-CFI-RFI-Changes-3.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KX7-LZZV] (describing 
the 2017 lesson plan as “bring[ing] . . . initial screening interviews closer to becoming final 
adjudications”); Memorandum from Bill Ong Hing to John Lafferty, Chief of USCIS Asylum Div. 2 
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://static.squarespace.com/static/50b1609de4b054abacd5ab6c/t/53558353e4b02 
071f74ee3c4/1398113107754/Response%20to%20USCIS%20Credible%20Fear%20Memo,%20Bill
%20Hing,%2004.21.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/34F9-Q6WQ] [hereinafter Bill Ong Hing 
Memorandum] (“The new credible fear standards are misleading[] and inappropriate.”); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU DON’T HAVE RIGHTS HERE”: U.S. BORDER SCREENING AND RETURNS OF 
CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RISK OF SERIOUS HARM (2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/ 
16/you-dont-have-rights-here/us-border-screening-and-returns-central-americans-risk [https://perma 
.cc/ZM8Q-ZSZA] (documenting fall in positive credible fear determinations after new credible fear 
guidance was issued in February 2014).  
197. See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 196, at 1.  
198. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, USCIS Asylum Div., to Asylum Office Dirs. et al. 
regarding Release of Updated Asylum Division Officer Training Course Lesson Plan, Credible Fear 
of Persecution and Torture Determinations (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-
asylum-revised-credible-fear-lesson-plan [https://perma.cc/DL2J-LS24].  
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when determining whether a person has a credible fear of persecution: 
only where the asylum seeker’s testimony is “credible, persuasive, 
and . . . specific” can the asylum officer find the “significant possibility” 
standard satisfied.199 Moreover, departing from previous guidance, the 
2014 lesson plan stated that the “significant possibility” standard for 
gauging credible fear does not encompass claims determined to have a 
“minimal or mere possibility, of success.”200 At the same time, the 
revised lesson plan included a new, highly detailed section on asylum 
case law.201 As Professor Bill Ong Hing noted, the lesson plan’s 
attempted “overview of asylum law” not only failed clarify “important 
variations in the law from federal circuit to federal circuit,” but also 
erroneously suggested that the standard of proof for a positive credible 
fear determination is equivalent to that required for a grant of asylum.202 
In February 2017, in response to President Trump’s January 2017 
executive order on border security, USCIS issued yet another updated 
lesson plan on credible fear determinations.203 Strikingly, the 2017 
lesson plan deleted preexisting instructions to asylum officers to find in 
favor of an asylum seeker “[w]hen there is reasonable doubt regarding 
the outcome of a credible fear determination.”204 Additionally, the new 
lesson plan removed language that emphasized the preliminary nature of 
the credible fear interview.205 Finally, the lesson plan directs asylum 
officers to give more weight to “inconsistencies between the applicant’s 
initial statement” to CBP during secondary inspection, stating that 
“[s]uch inconsistencies may provide support for a negative credibility 
finding . . . .”206 As explained above, the transcripts from border 
                                                     
199. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: 
CREDIBLE FEAR 13–14 (2014), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecution-
and-torture.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4UF-S5Z8].  
200. Id. at 14.  
201. Id. at 22–33.  
202. Bill Ong Hing Memorandum, supra note 196, at 7–8.  
203. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, USCIS Asylum Div., to All Asylum Office 
Personnel on Release of Updated Asylum Division Officer Training Course (ADOTC) Lesson Plans 
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxY0FCczROOFZ4SVk/edit [https:// 
perma.cc/69VT-368R]; Tal Kopan, Trump Admin Quietly Made Asylum More Difficult in the U.S., 
CNN (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/trump-immigration-crackdown-asylu 
m/index.html [https://perma.cc/K43L-JWH4].  
204. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 196, at 3 (quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., ASYLUM DIV. OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 16 (Feb. 28, 2014), http:// 
cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecution-and-torture.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4M8 
-UFGK]).  
205. Id.  
206. 2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR, supra note 85, at 21.  
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interviews have been shown to be rife with inaccuracies, a factor the 
lesson plan neglects to mention.207 The cumulative effect of these 
changes, some observers argue, is a heightened credible fear standard. 
Asylum experts have criticized the 2017 changes as “bring[ing] credible 
fear screenings closer to full adjudications,”208 sending a message to 
asylum officers to “be stricter,”209 and increasing the risk of erroneous 
negative credible fear findings.210 
Since releasing the 2017 lesson plan on credible fear determinations, 
the Trump administration has expressly called for elevating the standard 
of proof in credible fear interviews.211 Under an administration that 
construes “asylum reform” as “expand[ing] the use of expedited 
removal” and “return[ing] asylum seekers to safe third countries,”212 
procedural safeguards in the credible fear determination process acquire 
even greater importance. The next Part describes two such safeguards: IJ 
review of negative credible fear determinations, and RFRs, whereby an 
asylum seeker may receive a revised credible fear determination or a 
second credible fear interview. 
II. IJ REVIEW AND RFRS: PROTECTIONS AGAINST 
ERRONEOUS EXPEDITED REMOVAL 
The credible fear interview process should be reformed to better 
protect asylum seekers. More than twenty years after IIRIRA, however, 
the system by which the government screens entering noncitizens is 
deeply entrenched. And the current administration’s hostility to 
immigrants and refugees renders meaningful reform of the credible fear 
interview process a far-off goal. 
Absent comprehensive reform, asylum seekers and their advocates 
can invoke two administrative mechanisms to challenge negative 
                                                     
207. See infra text accompanying notes 151–57.  
208. Reena Arya, USCIS Revises Protection Screening Lesson Plans, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGR. 
NETWORK, INC., https://cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-revises-protection-screening-lesson-plans 
[https://perma.cc/6G59-XXJA].  
209. Kopan, supra note 203 (quoting former USCIS director León Rodríguez).  
210. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 196, at 4–5; Letter from Eleanor Acer, Senior Director of 
Refugee Protection, Human Rights First, to Lori Scialabba, Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Servs. & John Lafferty, Asylum Div. (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst. 
org/sites/default/files/credible-fear-lesson-plan-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRG8-N95N].  
211. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks 
-executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/YH6U-TUSU].  
212. Id.  
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credible fear determinations. The first permits an IJ to review a negative 
credible fear determination in a truncated hearing. The second allows an 
asylum seeker whose negative credible fear determination has been 
affirmed by an IJ to submit an RFR to the asylum office. Each year 
hundreds of negative credible fear determinations are reversed through 
IJ review and RFRs.213 Some asylum seekers who have received positive 
credible fear findings through these mechanisms have “textbook” 
asylum cases.214 Others have claims that are less certain to succeed at the 
merits phase.215 
This Part examines the mechanics of IJ review and RFRs. It begins by 
summarizing IJ review. It then explores the legislative and 
administrative history of IJ review, the record on which IJ review is 
based, and the role of counsel during IJ review. Next, this Part discusses 
RFRs. It takes a close look at two aspects of the RFR process: the 
burden of proof an asylum seeker must satisfy and stays of removal 
pending consideration of RFRs. 
A. An Asylum Seeker Who Receives a Negative Credible Fear 
Determination May Seek Review by an Immigration Judge 
IIRIRA and its implementing regulations provide that an asylum 
seeker who has received a negative credible fear determination may 
request that an IJ “prompt[ly]” review that determination pending the 
asylum seeker’s removal.216 If the IJ finds that the asylum seeker has a 
credible fear of persecution or torture, the IJ must vacate the asylum 
                                                     
213. See infra Part III.  
214. See Redacted Immigration Judge Complaint (Aug. 19, 2014), in Manning, supra note 45, 
Part XI (noting that in the summer of 2014, volunteer lawyers affiliated with the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association observed “several cases [in the Artesia detention center] where 
an individual had been denied [credible fear] by both the asylum office and IJ, only to meet with 
[an] attorney and find out there was a textbook asylum case”); Dara Lind, 9 Reasons Why Detaining 
Immigrant Families Is Turning into a “Shitshow,” VOX (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.vox.com/ 
2014/8/6/5971003/artesia-immigrants-detention-due-process-families-lawyers-asylum-court-border 
[https://perma.cc/5P5F-CRDA] (detailing case of a lesbian woman from El Salvador who received a 
negative credible fear determination, despite having what immigration attorney Laura Lichter called 
“a textbook asylum claim,” and was granted a positive credible determination after a successful 
RFR).  
215. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, DUE PROCESS DENIED: CENTRAL AMERICANS 
SEEKING ASYLUM AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2016), www.aila.org/File/ 
DownloadEmbeddedFile/68331 [https://perma.cc/6ZFG-ZMLF] (“Northern Triangle asylum 
seekers remain at a distinct disadvantage in seeking protection form persecution because of the gaps 
and inconsistencies in the interpretation of gang-related and gender-based asylum claims.”). 
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g)(2)(i), 1003.42, 
1208.30(g)(2)(i) (2017).  
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officer’s order and place the asylum seeker into section 240 removal 
proceedings.217 If the IJ concurs with the asylum officer’s negative 
credible fear finding, the asylum seeker is referred back to DHS and 
processed for removal.218 An IJ’s findings on review are not subject to 
appeal.219 
On its face, IJ review is a straightforward procedure. When an asylum 
seeker is found not to have a credible fear of persecution, the asylum 
officer must ask whether the asylum seeker wishes to have an IJ review 
the negative decision.220 An asylum seeker who answers affirmatively 
will be detained and served with a notice of referral to an IJ; an asylum 
seeker who refuses to either request or decline the review will be 
considered to have requested it.221 IJ review must be conducted “as 
expeditiously as possible,” ideally within twenty-four hours of, and no 
later than seven days after, a negative credible fear determination.222 The 
review itself must “include an opportunity for the alien to be heard and 
questioned by the immigration judge,” either in person or through 
telephone or video connection.223 The IJ is provided the written record of 
the asylum officer’s credible fear determination, and, during the 
proceeding, “may receive into evidence any oral or written statement 
which is material and relevant to any issue in the review.”224 The 
question of whether the asylum seeker has demonstrated a “significant 
possibility” of prevailing on a claim of persecution is reviewed de 
novo.225 Notably, asylum applicants must remain detained pending IJ 
review.226 
In sum, IJ review is neither a second credible fear interview nor a 
merits hearing. Rather, it provides an administrative buffer—a second, 
ostensibly neutral appraisal of an asylum seeker’s fear of returning 
home—before expedited removal. In assessing the scope and nature of IJ 
                                                     
217. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B). 
218. Id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).  
219. Id.  
220. Id. § 208.30(g)(1).  
221. Id. § 208.30(g)(1)(i).  
222. 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012).  
223. Id. 
224. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c). 
225. Id. § 1003.42(d). 
226. 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(g) (“An Immigration Judge shall have 
no authority to review an alien’s custody status in the course of a review of an adverse credible fear 
determination made by the Service.”). 
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review, it is instructive to examine its legislative and administrative 
history. 
1. IJ Review Was Intended to Provide a Safety Net for Asylum Seekers 
with Bona Fide Claims 
IJ review evolved as a compromise measure in a Congress divided 
between conservatives who wanted to tighten the credible fear screening 
process and lawmakers keen on preserving protections for asylum 
seekers. As IIRIRA took shape, refugee advocates urged members of 
Congress to carve out procedural safeguards for asylum seekers who 
faced the threat of expedited removal.227 Midway through the drafting 
process, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced an amendment that, among 
other protections, allowed asylum seekers who lost their credible fear 
determinations to appeal to an IJ before being removed.228 
The Leahy amendment responded to advocates’ fears that the new 
requirement that asylum seekers demonstrate a “significant possibility” 
of prevailing on their claims, coupled with the fast pace of expedited 
removal, would put individuals with meritorious cases at risk of 
removal.229 In debating the amendment, Senator Leahy and other 
lawmakers argued that any system that denied asylum seekers with 
negative credible fear findings “a chance to be heard before a judge” 
would inevitably send some persecuted persons “back summarily to the 
hands of [their] abusers.”230 Ultimately, the legislation that became 
IIRIRA included a vague provision granting asylum seekers the right to 
request IJ review after receiving a negative credible fear 
determination.231 It also directed the DOJ to promulgate regulations 
governing IJ review.232 
The variant of IJ review enshrined in the final regulations was less 
robust than some proponents of the Leahy amendment had proposed. 
                                                     
227. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 197–99.  
228. Id. at 158, 197. 
229. Id. at 151, 157.  
230. 142 CONG. REC. S4461 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing 
importance of administrative review in the context of the case of Fauziya Kasinga, an asylee who 
fled Togo after being threatened with female genital cutting and whose claim was initially adjudged 
not credible); id. at S4465 (statement of Sen. DeWine) (discussing ultimately successful asylum 
case of an Indian national who would likely have been summarily excluded under expedited 
removal). 
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012). 
232. Id. (“The Attorney General shall provide by regulation and upon the alien’s request for 
prompt review by an immigration judge.”).  
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Three aspects of the regulations deserve emphasis. First, during the 
notice and comment period, immigration attorneys and scholars urged 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to adopt a 
presumption in favor of IJ review following a negative credible fear 
determination.233 As one commentary argued, “[r]eview should be 
denied only if the alien affirmatively expresses a desire to abandon the 
claim for asylum and accepts removal to the home country.”234 But the 
INS expressly rejected that approach;235 the regulations provide that IJ 
review occurs only if an asylum seeker requests it.236 Second, advocates 
encouraged the INS to “favor in-person questioning by the IJ whenever 
possible,” contending that telephonic or video hearings would compound 
cultural and linguistic barriers.237 The regulations ultimately included no 
such directive in favor of in-person review, however; they allow the IJ to 
determine whether the hearing will be in person, or by telephone or 
video.238 Finally, advocates expressed concern that while the interim 
regulations allowed asylum seekers to “consult” with persons of their 
choosing prior to the review, they failed to clarify whether counsel could 
present issues to the IJ during the review itself.239 The final regulations 
remain ambiguous as to the role of counsel during IJ review.240 
A survey of the legislative and administrative history of IJ review 
yields two conclusions. First, IJ review was undoubtedly intended to 
provide a safety net to asylum seekers who, deprived of the safeguards 
that predated IIRIRA, received negative credible fear determinations 
despite having potentially meritorious claims.241 Expedited removal writ 
large prioritizes speed; IJ review was designed to promote accuracy.242 
Second, the version of IJ review that emerged in the DOJ’s 
implementing regulations was far less vigorous than it could have 
                                                     
233. Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum and Expedited 
Removal—What the INS Should Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1565, 1578 (1996).  
234. Id.  
235. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; 
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (Mar. 6, 1997) 
(stating that “the language of [the legislation] clearly provides that the alien has the obligation to 
request review of a negative credible fear determination”).  
236. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 202.  
237. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 233, at 1578.  
238. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c) (2017).  
239. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 208. 
240. Id. 
241. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 233, at 1578.  
242. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 202.  
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been.243 Shortly after IIRIRA took effect, one advocate painted a 
disheartening picture of the potentially toothless nature of IJ review: 
“[s]ome asylum seekers will be in a star-chamber proceeding where they 
have no counsel present, no record to examine, and a judge and 
interpreter which are faceless voices on the telephone.”244 That vision, it 
turns out, is sometimes not far from the truth.245 
2. IJ Review Is Inconsistently Executed 
For a process with so significant a function, IJ review has been the 
subject of surprisingly little agency guidance.246 As a result, the scope of 
IJ review differs between immigration courts and IJs.247 Two aspects of 
IJ review are especially variable: the evidence an IJ may consider, and 
the role of counsel before the immigration court. 
An IJ has substantial discretion over the nature of the record when 
conducting a review of a negative credible fear determination. The 
asylum officer’s “written record of determination” from the credible fear 
interview forms the basis of IJ review.248 That record consists of both the 
asylum officer’s interview notes and “a summary of material facts as 
stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any) relied upon by the 
officer, and the officer’s analysis of why, in light of such facts, the 
[applicant] has not established a credible fear of persecution.”249 
Additionally, under the regulations governing IJ review, an IJ “may 
receive into evidence any oral or written statement which is material and 
relevant to any issue in the review.”250 Practitioners report that IJs take 
inconsistent approaches to the submission and consideration of evidence 
                                                     
243. Id.  
244. Id. at 316 n.36 (quoting Letter from Martin A. Wenick, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Soc., to 
Richard A. Sloane, Immigration & Nat’lity Serv. (Jul. 7, 1997)).  
245. See, e.g., CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 9–10 (describing case where 
IJ affirmed the negative credible fear determination of an asylum seeker from El Salvador who was 
unrepresented during IJ review, struggled to recount the rapes she had suffered, and was later 
diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder). 
246. See Katharine Ruhl & Christopher Strawn, Accessing Protection at the Border: Pointers on 
Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Interviews, in 2015 AILA IMMIGRATION PRACTICE POINTERS 
741, 748 (2015), http://www.aila.org/File/Related/14072246a.pdf [https://perma.cc/H25L-AK2H] 
(“Because appellate review is limited, there is scant guidance on the scope and nature of [IJ] 
reviews.”). 
247. Id.  
248. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(a) (2017).  
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(2)(ii).  
250. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c). 
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that did not feature in the credible fear interview.251 Some IJs allow 
asylum seekers to discuss facts not addressed during the credible fear 
interview; others, however, “see their role on review as strictly appellate 
in nature, and will only consider that which was submitted to the 
[asylum officer] or referenced in the [asylum officer] referral.”252 
The role of counsel during IJ review is another area of uncertainty. 
The regulations make clear that an asylum seeker may consult with 
counsel “prior to” the credible fear review, but are silent as to whether 
an attorney may advocate on behalf of an asylum seeker during the 
review itself.253 Just a few days before IIRIRA took effect, Chief 
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memorandum to the 
immigration courts that put forth a narrow reading of the role of 
counsel.254 Although an asylum seeker may choose to consult with an 
attorney before IJ review, he wrote, “there is no right to representation 
prior to or during the review, either in the statute or the regulation.”255 
The memorandum went on to expressly limit an attorney’s ability to 
advocate during IJ review. “[N]othing in the statute, regulations or this 
[memorandum],” Creppy stated, “entitles an attorney to make an 
opening statement, call and question witnesses, cross examine, object to 
written evidence, or make a closing argument.”256 That circumscribed 
view of the role of counsel prevails today: the Immigration Court 
Practice Manual’s section on credible fear reviews echoes the 1997 
memorandum almost verbatim, granting IJs unfettered discretion to 
allow or deny representation during the review.257 
                                                     
251. Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748; see also SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra 
note 34, at 23.  
252. Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748 (“The best practice would be to consult with local 
practitioners to learn your particular IJ’s approach.”); Telephone Interview Carol Anne Donohoe, 
Attorney, ALDEA (Feb. 25, 2018) (noting that one IJ who appears remotely at the Berks family 
detention center refuses to consider any information outside “the four corners” of the credible fear 
interview).  
253. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c).  
254. See INS Reports on the First Three Months of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 74 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1101, 1103 (1997).  
255. Memorandum from Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to All Assistant Chief 
Immigration Judges et al. (Mar. 25, 1997), at 10, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/ 
legacy/2013/05/07/97-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7S8-H6UM] (emphasis in original).  
256. Id. at n.10; see also INS Reports on the First Three Months of Implementation of Expedited 
Removal, supra note 254, at 1103 (noting that “Sen. [Edward] Kennedy urged the INS to amend the 
regulations to specifically allow representation of asylum seekers” during IJ review). 
257. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL 125 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2017/ 
11/02/practicemanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7S8-H6UM]. 
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Practitioners who have advocated for a broader role for counsel 
during IJ review have encountered considerable resistance. Pro bono 
attorneys in family detention centers report that some IJs have refused to 
allow them to participate in credible fear reviews, even if they have 
entered an appearance with the immigration court.258 One administrative 
complaint, filed from Artesia in August 2014, documents a credible fear 
review in which the IJ informed the attorney that she had “no role” in the 
proceeding and refused to answer the attorney’s purely procedural 
questions.259 In the family detention center in Dilley, Texas, “[t]he 
detainee’s attorney is generally not permitted to speak during the IJ 
Review or present a theory of the case, case law, or arguments,” but 
rather “is limited to submitting a declaration and supporting 
documents . . . that may corroborate the applicant’s testimony.”260 
Moreover, pro bono attorneys in family detention centers are typically 
not notified of IJ review hearings until the day before the hearing, 
leaving “only a few hours to prepare numerous families for a hearing 
that could result in their deportation.”261 In some cases, attorneys are not 
notified at all.262 “Consequently, some noncitizens are unable to consult 
with counsel or other individuals until after the IJ has upheld a negative 
credible fear determination.”263 
EOIR has balked at carving out a greater role for counsel during IJ 
reviews of negative credible fear determinations. The American 
Immigration Lawyers Association has pointed out that the regulations do 
not preclude representation during IJ review and has asked EOIR to 
consider amending the Immigration Court Practice Manual to require IJs 
to allow counsel to assume a participatory role.264 To date, EOIR has 
                                                     
258. See Redacted Immigration Judge Complaint (Aug. 19, 2014), in Manning, supra note 45, 
Part XI (describing case where IJ confirmed receipt of an attorney’s notice of entry of appearance in 
immigration court, only to prohibit attorney from participating in the negative credible fear review 
of attorney’s client); SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 23. 
259. Redacted Immigration Judge Complaint (Aug. 19, 2014), in Manning, supra note 45, Part 
XI.  
260. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 23; see CARA Project Complaint to 
DHS, supra note 188, at 5–13 (documenting multiple cases in Dilley detention center where IJs 
refused to allow counsel to participate in IJ reviews of negative credible fear determinations).  
261. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 23. 
262. Id.  
263. Brief for Refugee and Human Rights Organizations and Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 18, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 
(2017) (No. 16-812) (emphasis in original).  
264. Meeting Agenda and Minutes, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n & Office of the Chief 
Admin. Hearing Officer (Oct. 22, 2015), at 7, https://web.archive.org/web/20170429161921/https:// 
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declined: it insists that IJs comply with the regulations as long as they 
allow asylum seekers to “consult” with persons of their choosing before 
the credible fear review.265 
The case of Melina,266 a detained asylum seeker from Guatemala, 
illustrates IJ review in its most perfunctory form.267 When Melina was 
fourteen, she was kidnapped and raped by a well-known drug-
trafficker.268 A few years later, after again encountering her attacker, she 
fled Guatemala with her one-year-old son.269 An asylum officer 
concluded that Melina did not have a credible fear of persecution, and 
she was ordered removed.270 With the help of an attorney, Melina 
requested IJ review.271 Citing the Immigration Court Practice Manual, 
the IJ barred Melina’s attorney from participating in the review and did 
allow Melina to explain why she had struggled to tell her story during 
the credible fear interview.272 The IJ affirmed Melina’s negative credible 
fear determination.273 
Melina and her counsel then requested that the Houston Asylum 
Office reconsider her negative credible fear determination.274 They 
included in her RFR a psychological evaluation that diagnosed Melina 
with posttraumatic stress disorder and emphasized the barriers she faced 
to fully recounting her history of persecution.275 The Asylum Office 
granted Melina’s RFR.276 After a second credible fear interview, Melina 
and her son were found to have credible fears of persecution, placed into 
section 240 removal proceedings, and released from detention.277 The 
next section sketches the procedures and uncertainties involved in the 
RFRs that Melina and hundreds of other asylum seekers have submitted 
to USCIS in recent years. 
                                                     
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/03/30/eoir_aila_fall_2015_minutes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A44F-XJZ7].  
265. Id.  
266. Melina is a pseudonym. See CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 4 n.11, 10.  
267. Id. at 10.  
268. Id.  
269. Id.  
270. Id. at 11.  
271. Id.  
272. Id.  
273. Id.  
274. Id.  
275. Id. at 10–11.  
276. Id. at 11.  
277. Id.  
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B. An Asylum Seeker May Request Reconsideration of a Negative 
Credible Fear Determination Before Removal 
In December 1997, the Executive Associate Commissioner for Field 
Operations of the INS278 issued a memorandum (1997 memorandum) to 
immigration officials tasked with enforcing expedited removal.279 At the 
time, expedited removal was just eight months old. The memorandum, 
which clarified “policy questions, procedural and logistical problems, 
and qualify assurance concerns,” included a paragraph on the “re-
interview of individuals” prior to removal from the United States.280 
“[A]t its discretion,” the memorandum stated, the government may 
“offer a second credible fear interview to any alien even if the alien has 
not established a credible fear before an asylum officer or after 
immigration judge review.”281 The memorandum provided a standard for 
adjudicating requests for a second credible fear interview.282 It also 
directed officials to refrain from removing individuals with outstanding 
requests for a re-interviews.283 
Two decades later, the 1997 memorandum remains the only publicly 
available agency guidance on RFRs. Although the memorandum still 
informs advocacy on behalf of asylum seekers, its directives often seem 
at odds with the government’s on-the-ground practices in RFR 
adjudications. This section discusses the current state of the RFR 
process. It begins by examining the regulatory framework surrounding 
RFRs. It then sheds light on two aspects of RFRs that have prompted 
confusion and frustration among immigration attorneys. First, it asks 
whether the burden of proof an asylum seeker must satisfy for USCIS to 
grant an RFR has evolved since the 1997 guidance was issued. Second, 
it examines whether DHS must stay an asylum seeker’s expedited 
removal pending the adjudication of an RFR.284 
                                                     
278. In March 2003, the functions of the INS were distributed to three divisions within the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and United States Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135.  
279. See Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1. 
280. Id.  
281. Id. 
282. Id.  
283. Id.  
284. See infra sections II.B.2–3.  
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1. The RFR Process Is Largely Uncodified 
RFRs are tethered to a single regulation: 8 C.F.R. section 
1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A), which provides that USCIS “may reconsider a 
negative credible fear finding that has been concurred upon by an 
immigration judge after providing notice of its reconsideration to the 
immigration judge.”285 Alongside the 1997 memorandum, this regulation 
supplies the official basis of a process by which asylum seekers who 
have received negative credible fear determinations may try to avoid 
expedited removal and enter section 240 removal proceedings. After a 
negative credible fear finding, an asylum seeker may submit an RFR to 
the regional Asylum Office that conducted the asylum seeker’s initial 
interview.286 If the RFR is approved, the asylum seeker is granted a 
second interview, or, in some cases, a positive credible fear 
determination.287 If the RFR is denied, the asylum seeker is processed 
for expedited removal.288 
Like IJ review of negative credible fear determinations, the RFR 
process remains largely uncodified.289 The regulation makes no mention 
of a standard that should inform USCIS’s decision to grant or deny an 
RFR, the materials on which the asylum officer may base that decision, 
and the degree of deference, if any, to be afforded the IJ’s affirmance of 
the initial negative credible fear determination.290 Because an asylum 
seeker cannot appeal an adverse RFR, there is little agency guidance on 
the criteria that control RFR adjudication.291 As a result, in at least some 
                                                     
285. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2017). 
286. Dree K. Collopy, Crisis at the Border, Part II: Demonstrating a Credible Fear of 
Persecution or Torture, 16-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2016); Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748.  
287. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).  
288. The regulations do not expressly state that an individual whose RFR has been denied is 
processed for expedited removal; however, hasty removal appears to be implied by the regulations. 
Cf. id. (stating that when an IJ affirms a negative credible fear determination, “the case shall be 
returned to the Service for removal of the alien”). Anecdotal evidence suggests that persons whose 
RFRs are denied are often hastily removed. See, e.g., Ernie Collette, #Dilley Dispatches: From 
Hope to Heartbreak in Forty-Eight Hours, LAW MARGINS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://lawatthe 
margins.com/dilleydispatches-hope-heartbreak-forty-eight-hours/ [https://perma.cc/L6ZN-K8EN] 
(describing case where USCIS denied an RFR and ICE removed the asylum seeker within a matter 
of hours); Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 5 (describing case where USCIS 
denied an RFR and ICE removed the asylum seeker less than twenty-four hours later). 
289. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (lacking guidance on the standard of review during, and 
the procedures involved in, RFRs). 
290. Id.  
291. See Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748.  
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detention centers, the procedures that govern RFRs are variable, 
personnel-contingent, and susceptible to arbitrary application.292 
2. An Asylum Seeker Bears the Burden of Proof in an RFR 
The 1997 memorandum directs the Asylum Office to grant an RFR 
where the asylum seeker has “made a reasonable claim” that 
“compelling new information concerning the case” will come to light 
during reconsideration.293 USCIS has issued no public guidance that 
modifies that standard. Yet practitioners who represent detained families 
report that USCIS often denies RFRs filed on behalf of asylum seekers 
whose fears of persecution were not fully disclosed or probed during the 
credible fear interview.294 
For example, in late 2015, USCIS abruptly adopted what appeared to 
be a heightened standard for adjudicating the RFRs of women and 
children detained in the two family detention centers in Texas.295 
According to pro bono lawyers, the Houston Asylum Office began 
granting RFRs only where asylum seekers could demonstrate that 
“egregious circumstances” informed their negative fear determination.296 
Data collected by the CARA Pro Bono Project showed a precipitous 
drop in RFR grants at the Dilley detention center; in the weeks after 
October 23, 2015, the denial rate “jumped from 23% to 66%.”297 At the 
same time, advocates observed, the Asylum Office accelerated RFR 
adjudications. “Whereas USCIS previously took a week or more,” 
attorneys noted in December 2015, “the Houston Asylum Office now 
issues a decision on a request for reconsideration within twenty-four to 
forty-eight hours, and sometimes on the same day that the request was 
submitted.”298 
The increase in RFR denials coincided with litigation that challenged 
the prolonged detention of asylum-seeking families.299 In July 2015, a 
                                                     
292. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, Attorney, ALDEA (Feb. 25, 2018) 
(commenting on cases out of the Berks County Residential Center); Telephone Interview with 
Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164 (commenting on cases out of the South Texas Family Residential 
Center); Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 2–5.  
293. Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1. 
294. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164.  
295. See Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 3. 
296. Id.  
297. Id. at 3–4.  
298. Id. at 4.  
299. Id. at 1.  
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federal district court judge ruled in Flores v. Johnson300 that DHS’s “no-
release” policy—under which asylum-seeking families were detained for 
the duration of their cases—violated the Flores settlement of 1997.301 
That settlement requires the government to release children from 
immigration custody “without unnecessary delay.”302 While the 
government’s appeal of the district court ruling was pending, DHS was 
under pressure to rapidly process families that included children.303 
Heightening the RFR threshold may have helped DHS reduce the 
average detention-times of family units and profess compliance with the 
Flores settlement.304 
Advocates raised the apparent policy shift with federal agency heads, 
to no avail. In December 2015, a coalition of immigrant rights 
organizations—the American Immigration Lawyers Association, Human 
Rights First, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, and the American 
Immigration Council—published an open letter to the directors of 
USCIS and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).305 Among 
other concerns, the letter documented numerous cases in which 
apparently meritorious RFRs had been denied, “le[ading] to the removal 
of families with viable claims for protection.”306 
Around the same time, the two dozen Central American families who 
would bring habeas challenges in Castro v. Department of Homeland 
Security307 were fighting to remain in the United States to seek 
asylum.308 After IJs affirmed their negative credible fear determinations, 
many of the Castro families submitted RFRs to the Asylum Office.309 In 
                                                     
300. 212 F. Supp. 3d 864 (C.D. Cal. 2015).  
301. Id. at 886–87.  
302. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV-85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 
1997).  
303. See Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 916–17 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (ordering DHS to 
release detained immigrant children and their parents “without unnecessary delay”); Letter on Due 
Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4.  
304. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4.  
305. Id. at 2–5.  
306. Id. at 2. 
307. 163 F. Supp. 3d 157 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017). 
308. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 427 (noting that petitioners sought “refuge” in the United States 
“over a period of several months in late 2015”).  
309. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292; see also Bryan Johnson, 
DHS’ Massive Fraud on Family Detention, AMOACHI & JOHNSON (June 14, 2016), 
https://amjolaw.com/2016/06/14/dhs-massive-fraud-on-family-detention/ [https://perma.cc/B4VS-7 
GUB] (displaying government data that shows denial of several RFRs filed by Castro families).  
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some cases, single families filed multiple RFRs.310 Attorneys vigorously 
argued that the families satisfied the credible fear threshold.311 They also 
alleged that asylum officers had committed serious procedural and 
substantive errors during the families’ credible fear interviews.312 But in 
case after case, the families’ RFRs—uniformly meritorious, according to 
their advocates—were denied.313 
Whether or not USCIS has officially sanctioned a harder line on 
RFRs, practitioners in family detention centers have had little success 
when invoking the “compelling new information” standard outlined in 
the 1997 memorandum.314 According to Fluharty, the Houston Asylum 
Office tends to grant RFRs only where the applicant can show that the 
credible fear interview was undermined by gross procedural deficiencies 
or official error.315 In contrast, the Asylum Office often denies RFRs 
where asylum seekers seek to disclose information not discussed during 
credible fear interviews, even when that information would support 
cognizable asylum claims.316 Attorneys in Dilley and Karnes 
hypothesize that the Houston Asylum Office has adopted a de-facto 
presumption against the credibility of persons who submit such RFRs.317 
They also surmise that when adjudicating RFRs, the Asylum Office 
applies Fifth Circuit asylum precedent, which is hostile to claims that 
might succeed in other circuits.318 Similarly, the Newark Asylum Office, 
which adjudicates RFRs out of the Berks family detention center, has 
suggested in recent years that it gives more weight to RFRs that are 
based on egregious official errors than those that involve new 
information.319 But, one attorney notes, RFR adjudications are opaque 
and unpredictable, even when representatives make a strong case that an 
official made a mistake.320 
                                                     
310. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292. 
311. Id.  
312. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., __ U.S. __, 137 
S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812). 
313. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292; Johnson, supra note 309 
(displaying government data that shows denial of several RFRs filed by Castro families).  
314. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164. 
315. Id. (“We’ve found the compelling new information [standard] to not be particularly 
persuasive unless . . . the asylum officer screwed up” or the interview suffered from “some sort of 
procedural flaw that was not the fault of the applicant.”).  
316. Id.  
317. Id.  
318. Id.  
319. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292. 
320. Id. (describing RFR adjudications as “a crapshoot”).  
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In any event, detained families who submit RFRs bear onerous and 
inconsistent burdens of proof. Pro bono attorneys in Dilley and Karnes 
often include in RFRs psychological evaluations that corroborate 
applicants’ claims and explain what went wrong in the credible fear 
interview.321 But in many cases, such evidence seems not to carry 
enough weight with USCIS to overcome the apparent presumption 
against the credibility of an asylum seeker who produces new or 
additional information at the RFR phase.322 Just as the outcome of a 
credible fear interview may hinge on the asylum officer an applicant 
happens to draw, the outcome of an RFR is largely contingent on the 
Asylum Office supervisor who reviews the request—no matter how 
compelling an applicant’s claim for relief.323 
3. In Theory, RFRs Should Stay Expedited Removal Orders 
According to publicly available DHS guidance, ICE must stay an 
expedited removal order if an asylum seeker has a pending RFR.324 The 
1997 memorandum expressly instructs immigration officials to refrain 
from executing an expedited removal order in a case where an RFR has 
yet to decided: officers “should cooperate by continuing to detain [a 
noncitizen who has submitted a request for reconsideration] until the 
second adjudication, and potentially also a second review by the 
immigration judge is completed.”325 In recent years, DHS 
communications have reiterated that policy. An internal ICE policy 
document from 2014, unearthed through Freedom of Information Act 
requests, directed officials at the Artesia family detention center to stay 
the removal of asylum seekers who submitted RFRs until the Asylum 
Office adjudicated the requests.326 Likewise, a 2015 DHS training 
manual for supervisors at the Houston Asylum Office suggested that ICE 
                                                     
321. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164; see CARA Project Complaint to 
DHS, supra note 188, at 5–13 (documenting multiple cases in which RFRs included professional 
psychological evaluations).  
322. CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 5–13.  
323. Id.  
324. Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1.  
325. Id. 
326. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ARTESIA FOIA HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2016) https://www.ameri 
canimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/foia_documents/artesia_highlights.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/AA2N-2YAF] (citing Artesia ICE Office of Chief Counsel Procedures of Oct. 31, 2014) 
(instructing ICE Deputy Chief Counsel to remind ICE officers that DHS “has agreed to place a ‘Z’ 
hold [staying removal] on residents [with pending RFRs] until the [Artesia Family Residential 
Center Asylum Pre-Screening Officer] provides notice of his/her decision to accept or deny the 
motion for reconsideration”). 
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was supposed to verify that the persons it removed from the Karnes 
family detention center did not have pending RFRs.327 
On-the-ground practices have not always faithfully reflected that 
guidance, however. Since 2014, advocates have documented several 
cases in which DHS removed families who were awaiting re-interviews 
or had pending RFRs.328 DHS itself has acknowledged as much: in 
December 2015, ICE Chief Counsel at the Dilley family detention center 
informed pro bono attorneys that ICE would no longer honor its 
“gentlemen’s agreement” to stay the removal of families with 
outstanding RFRs.329 That abrupt departure underscores the slippery and 
uncertain nature of RFRs generally; the “gentlemen’s agreements” that 
shape RFR protocols are malleable, untethered to precise regulatory 
commands, and revocable at ICE’s discretion. 
In sum, RFRs are by no means a cure-all for the ills of flawed 
credible fear determinations and IJ reviews. Advocates for detained 
families have attempted to shape consistent, formal reconsideration 
protocols.330 But DHS officials have at times disregarded mutually 
agreed-upon rules,331 and have apparently adopted a heightened standard 
for granting RFRs.332 As a result, the RFR process is circumscribed and 
personnel-specific.333 Such a hole-riddled safety net will inevitably fail 
to catch asylum seekers who during the credible fear interview do not 
disclose details pertinent to their claims—whether because of disability, 
language barriers, or other factors.334 
III. DESPITE THEIR FLAWS, IJ REVIEW AND RFRS HELP 
PREVENT THE ERRONEOUS REMOVAL OF ASYLUM 
SEEKERS 
On June 24, 2014, DHS opened an immigration detention center in 
the town of Artesia, New Mexico.335 Improvised and isolated, the 
detention center consisted of corrugated steel trailers on a federal law 
                                                     
327. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SOPS FOR ZHN TEAM TDY TO KARNES 19 (2015), https://www. 
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20Room/Policies_and_
Manuals/Credible_Fear_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6XL-GN3C].  
328. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 10.  
329. Id.  
330. See id. at 2–12; CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 4–15. 
331. See Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 2–12.  
332. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164. 
333. See supra section II.B.  
334. See Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 2–12.  
335. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 150.  
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enforcement training campus.336 There the Obama administration moved 
DHS’s expedited removal machinery into high gear.337 “We have 
already added resources to expedite the removal, without a hearing 
before an immigration judge, of adults who come from [El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras] without children,” DHS Secretary Jeh 
Johnson told a Senate committee in July 2014.338 “Artesia is one of 
several facilities that DHS will use to increase our capacity to hold and 
expedite the removal of the increasing number of adults with children 
illegally crossing the southwest border.”339 
The detention center soon became a 700-bed “deportation center” for 
hundreds of Central American women and children.340 Positive credible 
fear rates in Artesia were grossly disproportionate to the national 
average.341 In the nine months before June 2014, approximately 77% of 
asylum seekers passed their credible fear interviews.342 In contrast, just 
37.8% of the families detained in Artesia were deemed to have a 
credible fear of persecution during the first seven weeks of the facility’s 
existence.343 During that period, DHS removed more than 200 women 
and children to Central America.344 
As the weeks passed, volunteer lawyers mobilized in Artesia.345 
Between late July and December 2014, teams averaging fourteen 
lawyers per day provided pro bono assistance to detained families.346 
They consulted with mothers before their credible fear interviews, 
helped families obtain release on bond, and provided representation in 
                                                     
336. Taylor & Johnson, supra note 45, at 192–93. El Paso, the closest major city, is more than 
200 miles away from Artesia.  
337. Surge Hearing, supra note 59, at 14.  
338. Id.  
339. Id. at 15.  
340. Manning, supra note 45, at Part III; see also Cindy Carcamo, U.S. Sends First Planeload of 
Moms, Children Back to Honduras, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/ 
mexico-americas/la-fg-honduras-deportees-20140714-story.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/89UW-Z 
422].  
341. Manning, supra note 45, at Part III.  
342. Credible Fear Workload Report Summary: FY 2014, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Credible_Fear_and_Reasonable_Fear_FY
14_Q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSR5-LPWD]. 
343. Complaint at 31, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).  
344. Hylton, supra note 187. 
345. Manning, supra note 45, at Part V.  
346. Id. at Part IX.  
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immigration court.347 Within one month, the removal rate in Artesia had 
fallen by 80%, and within two months, by 97%.348 
Central to the lawyers’ efforts were their successful challenges to 
families’ negative credible fear determinations. With help from remote 
legal teams, lawyers in Artesia helped mothers request that IJs review 
their negative credible fear determinations, and represented them during 
those reviews.349 They also submitted RFRs to USCIS, requesting that 
the Asylum Office reverse negative credible fear determinations or grant 
asylum seekers new interviews.350 Between July and October 2014, 
volunteer attorneys submitted at least twenty-four RFRs to USCIS on 
behalf of families detained in Artesia.351 Twenty of those requests 
resulted in positive credible fear determinations.352 
This Part examines government data on negative credible fear 
determinations vacated through IJ review and RFRs, focusing on family 
detention cases. The data, obtained through Freedom of Information Act 
requests, reflect outcomes in family detention centers from 2014 to 2016 
in Artesia, New Mexico (now closed); Dilley, Texas; Karnes City, 
Texas; and Berks, Pennsylvania.353 The data suggest that despite their 
shortcomings, IJ review and RFRs have prevented the erroneous 
removal of hundreds of asylum-seeking families. 
                                                     
347. Id.  
348. Id.  
349. Id.; Victor Nieblas Pradis, Artesia: A Day in the Tour of Duty, Part I, THINK IMMIGR. (Oct. 
27, 2014), http://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2014/10/27/artesia-a-day-in-the-tour-of-duty-part-1 
[https://perma.cc/74MW-AXQ6].  
350. Id.; see also Letter from Stephen W. Manning, AILA-Coordinated Pro Bono Project Artesia, 
to the Houston Asylum Office, Request for Review of a Negative Credible Fear Determination (July 
2014), https://innovationlawlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Asylum-Office-Motion-Reconsi 
der_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PR-7QNZ] (sample RFR).  
351. See USCIS Asylum Div., Artesia, Karnes, National Stats, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED_Artesia_and_Karnes_Upda 
tes_Through_October_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXU8-2WXV]. 
352. Id.  
353. This section relies on raw data obtained from EOIR through a Freedom of Information Act 
request that the law firm Amoachi & Johnson, PLLC, submitted in 2016. Both the FOIA request and 
the data are available on the firm’s website. See EOIR Response Letter and Original Data on Family 
Detention Immigration Judge Credible Fear Reviews, AMOACHI & JOHNSON, https://amjolaw.com/ 
category/vault/page/3/ [https://perma.cc/36XY-K6EQ] [hereinafter EOIR Data]. This section also 
incorporates and cites data from the original study on family detention discussed by Eagly, Shafer & 
Whalley, supra note 45.  
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A. IJ Review Can Be a Meaningful Corrective to Erroneous Credible 
Fear Determinations 
In recent years, IJs have reversed thousands of negative credible fear 
determinations in cases involving families and individuals. Year on year, 
IJs have both conducted increasing numbers of negative credible fear 
reviews and reversed DHS’s negative fear findings at progressively 
higher rates.354 In fiscal year 2012, IJs conducted a total of 707 credible 
fear reviews, vacating just eighty-one negative credible fear 
determinations (11.5%).355 Less than five years later, the frequency of IJ 
review had increased a hundred-fold, and the reversal rate had nearly 
tripled: in fiscal year 2016, IJs conducted a total of 7,488 credible fear 
reviews, vacating 2,086 negative credible fear determinations 
(27.9%).356 Figure 1 shows these trends. 
 
Figure 1: 
Nationwide Total of IJ Reviews and Reversals, FY 2012–2016357 
 
                                                     
354. See OFFICE OF PLANNING ANALYSIS AND STATISTICS, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/ 
download [https://perma.cc/6YJJ-3JNQ].  
355. Id. 
356. Id.  
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As Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley show, IJs reverse negative credible 
fear findings more frequently in the family detention context than in 
cases not involving families.358 Between 2007 and 2016, their study 
found, IJs vacated 47% of the negative credible fear findings in five 
family detention centers.359 In contrast, between 2001 and 2016, 
approximately 16% of negative credible fear findings in non-family 
detained cases were vacated on IJ review.360 Significantly, “family and 
non-family detainees both obtained lawyers at an identical rate (23%) 
during such proceedings.”361 
Several factors may explain why IJs reverse negative credible fear 
determinations at higher rates in cases involving detained families. First, 
the credible fear screening process may be particularly ill-suited to 
evaluating the claims of the women and children who make up the vast 
majority of detained families. For example, female asylum seekers may 
be reluctant to disclose to male officials the details of the gender-based 
violence they have suffered, especially if accompanied by their 
children.362 Moreover, DHS may have applied a more exacting credible 
fear standard to asylum-seeking families, especially after 2014, in an 
effort to deter other Central Americans from seeking protection in the 
United States.363 Finally, many of the women and children fleeing 
Central America have suffered gang-related harms, which do not map 
neatly onto recognized grounds of relief.364 Before IJ review, detained 
families may have consulted with pro bono attorneys who screened them 
for additional bases of asylum eligibility or helped identify a nexus 
                                                     
358. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 148.  
359. Id.  
360. Id. 
361. Id.  
362. See SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 4.  
363. See Manning, supra note 45, at Part III (“Four days before Artesia opened, Vice President 
Joe Biden determined that ‘none of these children or women bringing children will be eligible under 
the existing law in the United States.’” (quoting Press Release, White House, Remarks to the Press 
with Q & A by Vice President Joe Biden in Guatemala (June 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/20/remarks-press-qa-vice-president-joe-biden-guatemala 
[https://perma.cc/7GV3-KYCK])). 
364. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Unconventional Refugees, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 89, 140 (2017) 
(“[T]hose fleeing gang violence generally are excluded from the definition of a refugee, unless they 
can prove that violence is intended to punish them for one of the protected characteristics (a nexus 
problem).” (emphasis in original)).  
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between the harms they fled and a protected characteristic, such as a 
particular social group.365 
Regardless, since 2014 IJs have conducted credible fear reviews and 
vacated negative fear findings in family detention cases at increasing 
rates.366 In fiscal year 2014, 768 asylum seekers in family detention 
requested IJ review of credible fear determinations.367 Total IJ reviews 
dipped in 2014, but rose to 1,098 reviews in fiscal year 2016.368 Reversal 
rates rose, as well.369 As shown in Figure 2, IJs reversed 40.4% of 
negative credible fear findings in family detention cases in fiscal year 
2014, 50.8% in fiscal year 2015, and 55.2% in fiscal year 2016.370 In 
other words, in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, it was more likely than not 
that where an IJ reviewed a negative credible fear determination in a 
case involving a detained family, the IJ found that the Asylum Office 
had erred.371 
 
Figure 2:  
Percentage of Negative Credible Fear Determinations Vacated on 
IJ Review in Family Detention Centers, FY 2014–2016372 
 
                                                     
365. See id. at 141 (noting that Central American asylum seekers “often win” asylum claims 
based on gang violence, if they have the benefit of legal counsel (emphasis deleted)).  
366. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 148–49.  
367. EOIR Data, supra note 353. 
368. Id. 
369. Id.  
370. Id.  
371. Id.  
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The aggregate figures disguise sharp differences in both the number IJ 
reviews and reversal rates across the four family detention centers in 
operation between 2014 and 2016. As Table 1 shows, asylum seekers 
detained in Artesia in 2014 and in Dilley in 2015 and 2016 were more 
likely to benefit from IJ review than families detained in Berks or 
Karnes.373 In fiscal year 2016, for example, IJs vacated negative credible 
fear determinations in approximately 68.3% of cases reviewed in Dilley; 
negative fear findings were reversed in approximately 37% of cases 
reviewed in Karnes.374 Such disparities may stem from divergent 
approaches to IJ review among the various immigration courts—which 
typically sit remotely, and conduct hearings by video feed—that 
presided over the cases of detained families.375 Inconsistent judicial 
behavior is also certain to play a role.376 Indeed, the EOIR data show 
striking variations in the rates at which individual IJs reversed negative 
credible fear determinations. In fiscal year 2016, for instance, one IJ who 
conducted credible fear reviews at Dilley affirmed 146 negative 
determinations and reversed seventy-two (33% reversal rate).377 Another 
affirmed fourteen negative determinations and reversed 240 (94.5% 
reversal rate).378 
IJ review thus appears to replicate the decisional disparities that 
plague the merits phase of asylum adjudications. In Refugee Roulette, 
Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag 
exhaustively studied the outcomes of thousands of defensive and 
affirmative asylum claims.379 Their data laid bare a system of 
                                                     
373. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. Inconsistent defensive and affirmative asylum adjudication has long been the subject of 
academic attention. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 302 (“[I]n 
the world of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable variation in decision making from one official 
to the next, from one office to the next, from one region to the next, from one Court of Appeals to 
the next, and from one year to the next, even during periods when there has been no intervening 
change in the law.”). 
376. Id. at 342–49 (noting that an IJ’s gender and INS or DHS work experience heavily influence 
the rate at which an IJ grants asylum). Although the Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag study 
concerned grant-rates at the merits phase of an asylum adjudication, its insights about the impact of 
an IJ’s gender and work experience are transferable to IJ review. 
377. EOIR Data, supra note 353. 
378. Id. 
379. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 295–96; see also ANDREW I. 
SCHOENHOLTZ, PHILIP G. SCHRAG & JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2014) (examining statistical 
disparities in affirmative asylum adjudications).  
16 - Shattuck.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  9:00 PM 
512 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:459 
 
adjudication that is neither consistent nor fair: “[w]hen an asylum seeker 
stands before an official or court who will decide whether she will be 
deported or may remain in the United States, the result may be 
determined as much or more by who that official is, or where the court is 
located, as it is by the facts and law of the case.”380 That insight applies 
with equal force to both the credible fear interview and IJ review of 
negative fear findings. Although IJs have reversed negative credible fear 
determinations at remarkably high rates, particularly in family detention 
cases, IJ review has produced uneven, judge-dependent outcomes. 
 
Table 1: 
Results of IJ Review in Family Detention Cases, FY 2014–2016381 
 
 Artesia Berks Dilley Karnes 
FY 2014     
Total IJ credible fear reviews 293 18 --- 457 
Total negative credible fear 
findings vacated 
149 2 --- 159 
Percentage of decisions 
vacated 
50.9% 11% --- 34.8% 
FY 2015     
Total IJ credible fear reviews 52 14 314 94 
Total negative credible fear 
findings vacated 
32 0 190 19 
Percentage of decisions 
vacated 
61.5% 0% 60.5% 20.2% 
FY 2016     
Total IJ credible fear reviews --- 11 631 456 
Total negative credible fear 
findings vacated 
--- 6 431 169 
Percentage of decisions 
vacated 
--- 54.5% 68.3% 37% 
 
Nonetheless, IJ review has emerged as an increasingly meaningful 
form of protection against erroneous removal, particularly in the family 
detention context.382 Between 2014 and 2016, IJs reversed the negative 
                                                     
380. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 302.  
381. Id.  
382. See Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 147–50.  
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credible fear findings of no fewer than 1,157 detained families.383 These 
figures are especially noteworthy in light of the constrained role that 
attorneys often play during IJ review.384 The high rates at which IJs have 
vacated DHS’s credible fear findings in family detention cases discredit 
the narrative—spun first by the Obama administration and now by the 
Trump White House—that the families who are fleeing the Northern 
Triangle have no rightful claim to humanitarian protection. To the 
contrary, the majority of those families, whether or not they receive 
positive fear findings after an initial interview, have credible fears of 
persecution.385 
B. RFRs Can Remedy Erroneous Credible Fear Determinations 
Official data on RFRs are hard to come by: USCIS does not include 
RFRs in its annual credible fear statistics.386 What little data are 
available, however, suggest that RFRs have protected numerous asylum 
seekers with potentially meritorious claims.387 Between February 9, 
2015, and March 31, 2016, asylum seekers detained in four family 
detention centers submitted at least 400 RFRs to the asylum office.388 
Just over half of these requests resulted in positive credible 
determinations after reconsideration.389 Even as the Dilley detention 
center saw the greatest number of IJ reversals of negative credible fear 
determinations, it was also the site of the most successful RFRs, closely 
followed by the Karnes detention center.390 Those figures likely speak to 
both the error-prone nature of the credible fear interviews conducted 
there and the presence of vigorous pro bono projects at the detention 
centers. 
  
                                                     
383. EOIR Data, supra note 353.  
384. See supra section II.A.2.  
385. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that “nearly 90% of individuals 
in family facilities from . . . countries [in the Northern Triangle] pass their credible or reasonable 
fear interviews”).  
386. See Credible Fear Statistics 2016, supra note 28.  
387. See Credible Fear—Requests for Reconsideration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National 
%20Engagements/PED_RFR_CredibleFear033116.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8L-NRCY].  
388. Id. 
389. Id.  
390. Id. 
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Figure 3:  
Requests for Reconsideration in Family Detention Cases, 
February 9, 2015 through March 31, 2016391 
 
 
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS TO IJ REVIEW AND RFRS: 
UPHOLDING NONREFOULEMENT 
IJ review and RFRs are far from toothless.392 But the immigration 
agencies have failed to consistently administer either process, 
undermining their potential to prevent the wrongful removal of people 
who are lawfully entitled to air their claims for relief.393 Current political 
realities weigh against abolishing expedited removal or reforming the 
credible fear determination process; reforming IJ review and anchoring 
RFRs in administrative rules present similar, but less formidable, 
challenges. The proposals that follow reflect three propositions. First, IJ 
review and RFRs protect asylum seekers’ due process rights without 
exacting a prohibitively high administrative burden on the government. 
Second, IJ review and RFRs support the United States’ obligations under 
domestic and international law to refrain from removing asylum seekers 
                                                     
391. Id.  
392. See supra Part III.  

















Artesia Berks Dilley Karnes
RFRs received Fear established after reconsideration
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to countries where they may suffer persecution or torture.394 And finally, 
IJ review and RFRs will become meaningful correctives to the flaws of 
the credible fear determination process only if asylum seekers have 
greater access to counsel. 
A. EOIR Should Require IJs to Admit New Evidence and Allow 
Counsel to Advocate During Credible Fear Reviews 
EOIR should undertake at least two reforms to enhance the accuracy 
and efficiency of IJ review. To begin, EOIR should require IJs to allow 
asylum seekers to introduce evidence that was not presented during the 
credible fear interview. This change would promote consistency among 
IJs, and, in theory, would reduce IJ rubberstamping of negative credible 
fear determinations. Moreover, opening the record would obey the call 
of the regulations that govern IJ review: those require that the judge 
make a de novo determination as to a noncitizen’s credible fear.395 In 
principle, de novo hearings rely on a clean, unbounded record, rather 
than a rehash of a prior—allegedly flawed—adjudication.396 
Additionally, EOIR should amend the Immigration Court Practice 
Manual to require that IJs allow counsel to advocate on behalf of clients 
during credible fear reviews.397 Practical and statutory considerations 
weigh in favor of this reform. An attorney may distill an asylum seeker’s 
experience into legal arguments the asylum seeker is unlikely to 
articulate, increasing both the efficiency and accuracy of IJ review, 
particularly with respect to novel claims.398 Moreover, the current 
limitations on attorney advocacy contravene the legislative purpose 
underlying IJ review: the more restricted the attorney’s role, the less 
                                                     
394. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, 1967 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 30 (1967), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/J72G-P5QF].  
395. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d) (2017).  
396. Schoenholtz, Schrag, and Ramji-Nogales make a similar point in describing the nature of 
section 240 removal proceedings after an asylum seeker’s affirmative application has been denied. 
SCHOENHOLTZ, SCHRAG & RAMJI-NOGALES, supra note 379, at 14.  
397. See supra text accompanying notes 253–57.  
398. See M. Margaret McKeown & Allegra McLeod, The Counsel Conundrum: Effective 
Representation in Immigration Proceedings, in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 286, 290 (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. 
Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, eds., 2009) (“Just outcomes are more likely . . . when effective 
counsel is present, because the facts necessary to a fair determination of the case will be developed, 
presented, and tested in light of the relevant law. In contrast, without an attorney or with an 
ineffective attorney, individuals testifying are frequently unaware of how to impart even the most 
fundamental information relating to the case to be decided.”).  
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robust the review, and the weaker the procedure’s potential to correct 
erroneous credible fear determinations. 
Furthermore, an IJ who sidelines a representative during IJ review 
arguably violates noncitizens’ right to counsel under federal law and due 
process principles under the Fifth Amendment.399 The INA grants 
noncitizens in “removal proceedings” the right to counsel at no expense 
to the government.400 To this author’s knowledge, no court has 
considered whether IJ reviews are “removal proceedings” within the 
meaning of the INA.401 But federal regulations provide a broad right to 
counsel in all immigration matters in which a person undergoes “an 
examination,” a criterion IJ review surely satisfies.402 Under the 
regulations, “the person involved” in such proceedings has “the right to 
be represented by an attorney or representative who shall be permitted to 
examine or cross-examine such person and witnesses, to introduce 
evidence, to make objections . . . and to submit briefs.”403 Notably, the 
regulations expressly disclaim a right to counsel during secondary 
inspections;404 but they say nothing about credible fear determinations, 
implying that the right attaches at all phases of the asylum process.405 
Finally, an asylum seeker whose retained counsel is denied the 
opportunity to speak or advocate during IJ review may well be deprived 
of the “fundamental fairness” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process clause.406 
Absent reform, IJ review will continue to replicate many of the same 
problems that frustrate the initial credible fear determination. It is 
cursory rather than searching, may be limited to a record just as narrow 
as that involved in the initial interview, and is highly contingent on the IJ 
before whom an applicant happens to appear. IJ review in its current 
form is incapable of ensuring that the United States will not remove 
                                                     
399. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). 
400. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (stating that a noncitizen enjoys a right to counsel during 
removal proceedings).  
401. Id.  
402. 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.5(b), 1292.5(b) (2017). 
403. Id.  
404. Id. But see Greg Boos & Robert Pauw, Reasserting the Right to Representation in 
Immigration Matters Arising at Ports of Entry, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 385 (2004) (suggesting 
that noncitizens have a right under the Constitution and federal law to representation during 
secondary inspection).  
405. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.5(b), 1292.5(b).  
406. See Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 169, 177 (2010) (discussing how considerations of “fundamental fairness” might provide 
a basis for expanding access to counsel in immigration proceedings).  
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individuals to face persecution, torture, or death in their home countries. 
That so many RFRs have been successful in recent years makes this 
clear. 
B. DHS Should Adopt a Consistent Standard for Adjudicating RFRs 
Three reforms may help RFRs prevent wrongful expedited removals. 
First, DHS should direct its officials to refrain from removing asylum 
seekers with pending RFRs. Such removals fly in the face of the United 
States’ nonrefoulement obligations. Second, USCIS should adopt a clear 
standard for adjudicating RFRs that comports with its mandate to 
accurately assess asylum seekers’ fears of persecution. USCIS would 
improve the status quo if it renewed its commitment to the “compelling 
new information” standard outlined in the 1997 memorandum.407 Better 
yet, USCIS should direct the Asylum Office to grant RFRs where 
applicants show either that official error tainted the first interview or that 
they wish to disclose any additional information about their claims. That 
approach is consistent with the credible fear regulations’ preference that 
persons with borderline claims be placed into removal proceedings 
rather than face expedited removal.408 Finally, USCIS should codify 
RFR procedures in regulations or publicly available agency guidance. 
That would incentivize officials to follow uniform rules—and help 
advocates hold officials to account when they do not. 
C. Limitations of the Proposed Reforms 
Asylum seekers who lack access to counsel are unlikely to benefit 
from the reforms proposed here. Courts often draw attention to the 
“labyrinth”-like nature of removal proceedings and the profound 
difficulties pro se noncitizens encounter in immigration court.409 Asylum 
seekers who are represented at the merits phase prevail at substantially 
higher rates than those who lack attorneys.410 In fiscal year 2016, for 
                                                     
407. See Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1.  
408. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)–(e).  
409. See, e.g., Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Deprivation of the 
statutory right to counsel deprives an alien asylum-seeker of the one hope she has to threat a 
labyrinth almost as impenetrable as the Internal Revenue Code.”).  
 410. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 340 (stating that in their study, 
“[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as 
the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel”); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, 
The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 745 (2002) 
(noting that “statistics show that represented [asylum] applicants obtain relief at significantly higher 
rates than unrepresented ones”).  
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example, just 10% of pro se applicants were granted asylum; in contrast, 
52% of represented asylum seekers won the right to remain the United 
States.411 These disparities were even more pronounced in asylum cases 
involving women and children.412 
Asylum seekers who undergo credible fear interviews and IJ review 
without counsel suffer disadvantages that resemble those unrepresented 
applicants face at the merits phase: they are unfamiliar with proper 
procedures, have trouble synthesizing facts with complicated legal 
standards, and face heightened risks of intimidation or 
miscommunication.413 Legal orientation programs may ameliorate these 
problems, but cannot guide all vulnerable asylum seekers through the 
credible fear determination process. As long as expedited removal 
remains on the books, noncitizens should be appointed counsel once 
they express fear of returning home.414 At least, noncitizens who receive 
negative credible fear determinations should be appointed counsel before 
IJ review. 
Moreover, barring dramatic changes in DHS policy, the proposed 
reforms will play out in the harsh confines of immigration detention.415 
The harms of immigration detention, including its adverse impact on 
                                                     
411. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CONTINUED RISE IN ASYLUM DENIAL 
RATES: IMPACT OF REPRESENTATION AND NATIONALITY (2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/rep 
orts/448/ [https://perma.cc/F7AX-JP8T]. 
412. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, REPRESENTATION IS KEY IN 
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING WOMEN WITH CHILDREN (2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immig 
ration/reports/377/ [https://perma.cc/8UT3-XPTT].  
413. See Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing an Effective Model 
of Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1001, 1002 (2015) (“Along with 
trauma, language barriers and cross-cultural differences can affect asylum seekers’ abilities to 
recount their past experiences, as can a lack of understanding of the legal framework for asylum 
claims.”).  
414. See id. at 1026 (arguing in favor of “a universal right to counsel for asylum seekers”); 
Nimrod Pitsker, Comment, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counsel 
for Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169, 171 (2007) (arguing that under the Mathews v. Eldridge 
due process analysis, “the Constitution requires appointed counsel for asylum seekers”).  
415. See Aria Bendix, ICE Shuts Down Program for Asylum-Seekers, ATLANTIC (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/ice-shuts-down-program-for-asylum-
seekers/529887/ [https://perma.cc/ND5Z-RJRV] (reporting Trump administration’s decision to 
terminate a program that allowed asylum-seeking families to enroll in case management in lieu of 
detention); Chris Hayes & Brian Montopoli, Trump Administration Plans Expanded Immigrant 
Detention, Documents Say, NBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-
news/trump-administration-plans-expanded-immigrant-detention-documents-say-n729021 
[https://perma.cc/HL8X-QUZR] (reporting that the Trump administration “is planning to radically 
expand . . . the detention of immigrant families seeking asylum in the United States”).  
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children and families, are serious and well documented.416 Detention 
centers tend to be located in remote, rural areas.417 Asylum seekers in 
detention face steep barriers to accessing counsel.418 They experience 
trauma and depression at alarming rates.419 Medical care is often 
inadequate.420 Telephone calls to family and attorneys are limited.421 
Guards may be abusive.422 Children often yearn to escape.423 IJ review 
                                                     
416. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 
203 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2015) (“Evidence shows that migrants suffer unthinkable harms 
while imprisoned.”); WENDY CERVANTES, FIRST FOCUS CTR. FOR THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS, 
FAMILY DETENTION: THE HARMFUL IMPACT ON CHILDREN 1 (2015), https://firstfocus.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2015/07/Family-Detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPN6-MN9B] (citing research that 
shows that “even a short amount of time in detention is harmful to children”); Letter from Am. 
Immigration Law. Ass’n et al. to Megan Mack, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., The Psychological Impact 
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HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION 
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417. See DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT supra note 5, at 40 (noting that existing family 
detention centers “are over an hour’s drive one-way from major, metropolitan areas”).  
418. Id.  
419. AILA Letter on Psychological Impact of Family Detention, supra note 416, at 2.  
420. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., FATAL NEGLECT: HOW ICE IGNORES DEATHS 
IN DETENTION 3 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/fatal_neglect_aclu 
dwnnijc.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9FK-9S52] (noting that “poor medical care contributes to the death 
of immigrants in federal immigration custody with alarming frequency”); Letter from Am. 
Immigration Council et al. to Megan Mack & John Roth, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ICE’s Failure to 
Provide Adequate Medical Care to Mothers and Children in Family Detention Facilities 1 (July 30, 
2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/deplorable-medical-treatment-at-fam-
detention-ctrs/public-version-of-complaint-to-crcl [https://perma.cc/99EC-GZC7] (summarizing 
“complaint filed on behalf of several mothers and their children who received substandard medical 
care while detained at the family detention facilities in Dilley and Karnes City, Texas, and Leesport, 
Pennsylvania”).  
421. See Julia Harumi & Carl Takei, Forget About Calling a Lawyer or Anyone at All if You’re in 
an Immigration Detention Facility, AM. C.L. UNION (June 15, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
immigrants-rights/deportation-and-due-process/forget-about-calling-lawyer-or-anyone-all-if 
[https://perma.cc/RQ2P-M4WF]. 
422. See Renée Feltz, Immigration Facility Guard Given Jail Time for Sexual Assault of 
Detainee, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/23/immig 
ration-detention-center-guard-sexual-assault-prison [https://perma.cc/BTW4-P9G2] (describing 
conviction of guard for sexual assault of a nineteen-year-old mother detained in the Berks family 
detention facility); Esther Yu His Lee, Chances Are High That if You’re Abused in Immigration 
Detention, No One Will Care, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/dhs-
33000-complaints-abuse-civic-cf154614c006/ [https://perma.cc/X2H9-GW9G] (noting that DHS 
“opened investigations into a total of 247 of 33,126 complaints lodged against its component 
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and RFRs can prolong the time an asylum seeker remains detained—in 
some cases by a matter of days, and in others, weeks or months.424 IJ 
review and RFRs thus have a double-edged quality: even as these 
procedures allow asylum seekers to challenge the government’s order 
that they return home, they keep asylum seekers behind bars, exacting a 
price in liberty and dignity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Refugee Act of 1980 enshrines the United States’s commitment 
to refrain from removing any person to a country where that person may 
suffer persecution. Expedited removal has eroded that commitment. In 
recent years, a growing number of noncitizens have been involuntarily 
returned to homelands they said they feared, only to encounter death, 
torture, or other harms. Asylum seekers who are ensnared in expedited 
removal have little in the way of a safety net. But two procedures—IJ 
review of negative credible fear determinations and RFRs—have in 
hundreds of cases prevented the erroneous removal of people with 
potentially meritorious claims. 
IJ review is a crucial stopgap in the expedited removal regime. 
Formulated by lawmakers who feared that expedited removal would 
jeopardize asylum seekers’ claims for protection, IJ review was intended 
to be a force for accuracy in a statutory scheme that privileges speed. IJ 
review has helped compensate for the excesses of expedited removal, 
particularly in the family detention context. But it is inconsistently 
executed, highly dependent on the sympathies of individual judges, and 
largely uncodified. EOIR can begin to correct for these deficiencies by 
amending the Immigration Court Practice Manual to provide a greater 
role for counsel during IJ review. 
The credible fear regulations allow an asylum seeker to request 
reconsideration after a negative credible fear determination. 
Unfortunately, the RFR process remains opaque. The government has 
                                                     
423. See Valeria Fernández, These Asylum-Seekers Are Being Forced to Raise Their Kids in 
Immigration “Jails,” PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 7, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-07-
07/these-asylum-seekers-are-being-forced-raise-their-kids-immigration-jails 
[https://perma.cc/64A3-FQ88].  
424. In Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley’s study, supra note 45, on average, detained families waited 
“three to four days” for IJ review of negative credible and reasonable fear determinations. But IJ 
review may induce “other delays,” including “any delays in release following the judge’s reversal.” 
Id. at 150. RFRs typically entail longer delays. In some cases, families who submitted RFRs were 
detained for weeks or months after the credible fear review hearing. See CARA Project Complaint 
to DHS, supra note 188, at 5, 9–10 (describing cases where families were detained for weeks or 
months while RFRs were pending).  
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failed to adhere to the policy guidance it set out shortly after expedited 
removal took effect. It has also neglected to communicate any changes 
in official policy that would explain why it has denied apparently 
meritorious RFRs in recent years. As a result, the procedures 
surrounding RFRs are shaped less by top-down rules than everyday 
negotiations between frontline asylum officers, DHS personnel, and 
advocates on behalf of asylum seekers. USCIS should direct all asylum 
offices to grant RFRs where applicants show either that official error 
tainted the first interview or that they wish to disclose additional 
information about their claims. That standard is congruent with DHS’s 
obligation to accurately assess asylum seekers’ fears of persecution. 
A single-interview credible fear determination process does not and 
cannot prevent the erroneous removal of asylum seekers with potentially 
viable claims. As long as bona fide asylum seekers are sent home, the 
United States will violate its obligations under the Refugee Convention 
and offend the principle of nonrefoulement set forth in the INA. 
Consistent, transparent policies on RFRs and IJ review cannot on their 
own guarantee that the United States will refrain from returning asylum 
seekers to countries where they may experience persecution—but they 
can help. 
 
